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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 FEBRUARY 1956 
THE WILLS BRANCH OF THE WORTHIER 
TITLE DOCTRINE* 
Joseph W. Morrisf 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No. 4 
A"page of history iSt worth a volume of logic"
1 when it comes 
to understanding real property concepts.2 This is especially 
true when dealing with the wills branch of the worthier title doc-
trine. 3 For the wills branch, like the inter vivos branch of the 
doctrine,4 had its origin in the English feudal society. Indeed, at 
its inception it seems to have been inseparably bound to that so-
ciety. It was, therefore, a rule which eventually became no longer 
• This article is a part of a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of 
Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. In 
the preparation of this paper the author is deeply indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes 
for his helpful criticisms and suggestions. 
t A.B. 1943, LL.B. 1947, Washburn University; LL.M. 1948, S.J.D. 1955, University of 
Michigan; member, Kansas and Oklahoma bars.-Ed. 
1 Holmes, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 at 349, 41 S.Ct. 506 (1921). 
2 Justice Cardozo went even further. He said: "Let me speak first of those fields where 
there can be no progress without history. I think the law of real property supplies the 
readiest example." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 54 (1921). It is also 
interesting to note that Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion in the leading case in the 
United States involving the inter vivos branch of the worthier title doctrine. See Doctor 
v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). 
3 For brevity and convenience the wills branch of the worthier title doctrine will 
hereinafter be referred to as the "wills branch," the "rule" or the "doctrine." In general, 
on the wills branch see I AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §4.19 (1952); 3 POWELL, REAL 
PROPERTY §381 (1952); Harper and Heckel, "The Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L. 
REv. 627 (1930); comments, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 507 (1952); 1952 WASH. UNIV. L. REv. 
117; notes, 39 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1953); 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); 46 HARV. L. REv. 993 
(1933); 14 N.C.L. REv. 90 (1935); 16 TENN. L. REv. 358 (1940). For an amusing account 
involving the wills branch as it relates to title problems see Crocker, "The History of a 
Title, A Conveyancer's Romance," AM. L. REv., Oct. 1875, reprinted in PATION, TITLES 
§34, n. 85 (1938). 
4 Professor Warren thought it improper to link together the inter vivos and the wills 
branch of the worthier title doctrine. He observed: "The heir-devisee rule is dead or 
dying. It has outlived whatever usefulness it ever had. It is in a state of nocuous desue-
tude. The restaters have recognized this. They have themselves recommended its legis-
lative repeal. But the ruling against a remainder to a grantor's heirs is a living, growing 
rule,-very sensible and very serviceable. A similar rule has been evolved applicable to 
personal property. A liaison between the quick and the dead is not fitting. Why tie a 
bull-pup to the tail of a dead cat?" Warren, "A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs," 22 
TEX. L. REv. 22 at 27-28 (1943). 
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useful and was accordingly abolished in England by statute.5 
Strange though it may seem to the layman and even to the lawyer, 
it is nevertheless a fact that many a rule long since abolished in 
England still exists in the United States. It is the writer's view 
that we are here concerned with just such a rule. Indeed, it might 
well be said that there would be little if. any justification for this 
paper if it were settled law that this rule was nonexistent in the 
United States.6 However, before we can understand its modern 
consequences, a knowledge of its historical setting and application 
are essential. It is, therefore, the purpose of this article to examine 
the history and origin of the wills branch of the worthier title 
doctrine, to ascertain the extent of its application and the manner 
of its application, to determine the legal consequences flowing 
therefrom, and to consider the desirability of its continued exist-
ence. No treatment will be given here to the inter vivos branch of 
the worthier title doctrine, since it has been the subject of a previ-
ous paper.7 
A definitive statement of a legal proposition is frequently too 
inclusive or too exclusive, yet it seems that if such a statement 
can be made with accuracy it is eminently desirable. It gives the 
reader, especially if he is not familiar with the subject matter, a 
starting point. It affords to all of us a common place to begin 
our thinking. s·ubject to the qualifications hereafter discussed, 
the rule of the English common law, forming the basis of this paper, 
may be stated as follows: 
A devise of a present or future interest in land to the heir of 
the testator, either by name or in form, is void if the heir takes b)1 
virtue of the devise precisely the same interest he would have taken 
if the devise had been stricken out of the will. 
IL HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE RULE 
It was about the middle of the sixteenth century when the wills 
branch of the worthier titJe doctrine made its appearance.8 There-
after it grew and expanded steadily; in fact its formulation and 
development cover a span of almost three centuries. Unlike the 
rule in Shelley's Case or the rule in Wild's Case, this rule is not 
5 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, §3 (1833). 
6 For a discussion of the rule in the United States, see Part VIII infra. 
7 See Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 133 
(1949). 
s Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555). 
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identified with any particular decision.9 Rather, it seems to have 
developed step by step and case by case not unlike the develop-
ment of the rule against perpetuities.10 Generally speaking, the 
rule was applied in two classes of cases: (1) those in which the 
devise was to an individual who was in fact the testator's heir, and 
(2) those in which the devise was in form to the testator's "heirs at 
law." 
A. A Devise to an Individual Who Was in Fact the 
Heir of the Testator 
It became thoroughly engrained as a part of the English com-
mon law that an heir of the testator could not take by purchase 
under a will an interest in land which was precisely the same as 
that which he would have taken if no devise to him had been 
made.11 For example, if T devised land to A, his only son and heir, 
the devise to A was void, and he took by descent instead of under 
the will. In Hargrave's note to Coke on Littleton, it is said: "One 
leading principle, which this and the other authorities seem clearly 
to establish, is, that whenever a devise gives to the heir the same 
estate in quality as he would have by descent, he shall take by the 
latter, which is the title most favoured by the law ... .''12 
It is interesting at this point to compare this rule with the 
inter vivos branch of the doctrine. The inter vivos branch applied 
only if the limitation was in form to the grantor's "heirs." It can 
thus be seen that this rule was very different. Its application was 
much broader; that is to say, if the devise were to an individual 
by name, and if at the time of the testator's death that individual 
9 It has been stated that the inter vivos branch of the doctrine is known as the "Rule 
in Bingham's Case." PATION, TITLES §133 (1938). This is the only statement with which 
the writer is familiar wherein either branch of the doctrine has been linked to any single 
case. 
10 For a case by case development of the rule, see Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of 
Worthier Title," 24 Iu.. L. R.Ev. 627 (1930). 
11 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Bashpool's Case, 2 Leo. IOI, 
74 Eng. Rep. 392 (1585); Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602); 
Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648); Hedger v. Rowe, 3 Lev. 127, 83 
Eng. Rep. 612 (1682); Clerk v. Smith, I Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Emerson v. 
Inchbird, 1 Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487, 93 
Eng. Rep. 651 (1721); Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1270, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748); Hurst 
v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759); Chaplin v. Leroux, 5 M. &: S. 
14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816); Doe v. Timins, I B. &: Ald. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818); 
Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K.. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833); Strickland v. Strickland, 
10 Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Rep. 659 (1839); Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 
144 (1840); Rolle's Abr. 626 (1668); 2 BLACKST. COh-lM. 241-242; POWELL, DEVISES 420 
(1788). 
12 l Co. Lrrr. 12b, note (1832). 
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happened to be the testator's heir at law, the rule applied and the 
individual took by descent instead of under the will. So the rule 
applied if the devise was to the testator's daughter,13 his grand-
daughter,14 or his grandson.15 Of course, by far the greatest num-
ber of cases arose when the devise was to the testator's eldest son.16 
This was brought about by the doctrine of primogeniture. Since 
the eldest son was the heir at law, the land descended to him unless 
by custom a different mode of descent had been established.17 It 
was natural, therefore, that many of these cases arose because fre-
quently a testator would devise land to his eldest son. 
Perhaps it should also be pointed out that this rule applied to 
both present interests (possessory estates) and to future interests,18 
whereas the inter vivos branch of the doctrine applied to future 
interests only. Thus, if T, by his will, devised land in fee simple 
to A, his eldest son, the rule was applied and A took by descent.19 
Likewise, if T attempted to create a future interest in A, his son 
and heir, by devising land to W for life, remainder to A in fee, 
the rule was applied and A took a reversion by descent instead of 
a remainder by purchase.20 
B. A Devise in Form to "Heirs" or "Right Heirs" of the Testator 
As heretofore indicated, the doctrine likewise applied if the 
devise was in form to the testator's "heirs at law." Here, if a 
testator devised land in form to "my heirs" or my "right heirs," the 
devise was void and the heir took by descent.21 Seemingly, how-
ever, there was less insistence by the English courts in these cases 
that the quantity and quality of the estate devised be the same.22 
13 Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487, 93 Eng. Rep. 651 (1721). 
14 Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. & K.. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833). 
15 Clerk v. Smith, I Salk. 241, 91 ,Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Doe v. Timins, I B. & Aid. 
531, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). 
16 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 
82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648); Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602); 
Emerson v. lnchbird, I Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Hurst v. Earl of 
Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759). Dictum in Paramour v. Yardly, 2 Plow. 
539, 75 Eng. Rep. 794 at 803 (1579). 
17 Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1589). See Neilson, "Custom and the 
Common Law in Kent," 38 HARv. L. REv. 482 (1925). 
;J.S See Part V-B-4 infra. 
19 Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602). 
20 Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648). 
21 Counden v. Clerk, Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. , 180 (1868); Nottingham v. Jennings, I 
Comyns 81, 92 Eng. Rep. 970 (1700); Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432 
(1740); Doe v. Maxey, 12 East 589, 104 Eng. Rep. 230 (1810); dictum, Pibus v. Mitford, 
I Vent. 372, 86 Eng. Rep. 239 (1674); I HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTS 571 (1787). 
22 For a discussion concerning the quantity and quality of the estate devised see Parts 
V-A and B. 
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At least this conclusion appears warranted by the language used 
in the cases. For example, in Counden v. Clerk23 a testator de-
vised land to his son John, but if John should die without lawful 
issue, then unto the "right heirs" male of the testator. The court 
held that the devise to the heirs of the testator was void "for this 
is a positive rule, that a man cannot raise a fee-simple to his own 
right heirs by the name of heirs, as a purchase, neither by convey-
ance of land, nor by use, nor by devise."24 This case was approved 
in Godolphin v. Abingdon.25 
Likewise in Doe v. Maxey26 the court again failed to stress 
that the estate devised had to be of the same quantity and quality 
before the rule applied. There, certain estates tail had been de-
vised, with "an ultimate remainder to the testator's own right 
heirs forever." In commenting on this end limitation, the court 
observed that "it was unnecessary for him to devise, for it remain-
ed notwithstanding in him as an undisposed reversion, and de-
scended to his own right heirs .... And the only operation of such 
a devise in terms is to exclude a conclusion that any other person 
was intended to take it; for certainly his heirs would take by de-
scent and not by the will." 
It can thus be seen that this type of a limitation in a will and 
the rule applied thereto bore close resemblance to the inter vivos 
branch of the doctrine. Indeed, counsel pointed this out in Doe 
v. Maxey by saying, "A limitation to the heirs of a third person 
may operate as a contingent remainder; but a limitation by deed 
or will to the right heirs of the grantor or devisor. . . is only the 
old reversion."27 Hence, it would seem that here, as in the rule 
in Shelley's Case and as in the inter vivos branch of the worthier 
title doctrine, if the language was in the form to the "heirs" of 
the testator Lhe English courts in effect construed the word "heirs" 
as a word of limitation. . Nor is it surprising to find the rule being 
applied in this fashion, for there is fully as much justification here 
to treat the word "heirs" as a word of limitation as there is in the 
rule in Shelley's Case or in the inter vivas branch of the doctrine. 
Indeed, a contrary treatment would hardly have been understand-
able, since the real reason for treating the word "heirs" as a word 
of limitation was the same in all three cases.28 
23 Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. 180 (1868). 
24 80 Eng. Rep. 180 at 181. !Wies added. 
252 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432 (1740). 
26 12 East 589, 104 Eng. Rep. 230 at 235 (1810). 
21 104 Eng. Rep. 230. !Wies added. 
28 See Part III infra. 
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C. A Rule of Law 
This rule was a rule of law dictated by the policy of the age, 
not merely a rule of construction.29 In the early case of Preston 
• v. Holmes,30 this was made unequivocally clear. In that case the 
testator devised land to his wife for life with a remainder in fee 
to his eldest son John. The question was whether John took by· 
purchase under the will or by descent. It was argued that John 
could elect either to take under the will or by descent, which-
ever he chose. In denying this contention, Chief Justice Roll 
held "that the devise is void, and that it is not in the power of 
John the son, to make the election to take by descent or by pur-
chase at his pleasure, but he must of necessity take the land as 
the law directs, which is by descent .... "31 Justice Bacon was 
of the same view and held "that the heir doth here take by descent, 
and not by purchase, for this the law says, and he cannot alter 
it .... "32 The rule being one of law and being tightly bound 
to feudal concepts, it was applicable only to real property.33 At 
least the writer has found no English decisions wherein it was 
applied to personal property. 
Ill. REASONS FOR THE RULE IN ENGLAND 
It seems obvious that this rule could not become so thoroughly 
recognized as a part of the English common law unless some policy 
dictated that it should be so. Many and varied reasons for the rule 
have been given and no doubt different reasons existed at different 
times. In Biederman v. Seymour,3-1 one of the last English cases 
on the point, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, in looking 
back over the three centuries during which the doctrine had flour-
29 Counden v. Clerk, Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. 180 (1868); Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 
82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648). 
30 Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648). 
31 82 Eng. Rep. 601 
32 Ibid. 
33 The cases do not discuss this point directly, but all of the English cases found, 
except one, do involve real property. In Swaine v. Burton, 15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep. 
792 at 794 (1808), there was a devise of certain real property and a bequest of a leasehold 
estate to trustees to convey to the heir of the testator. In that case Lord Eldon held that 
the rule did not apply to eith~ the real property or the personal property, but in so doing 
made the following observation: "This is, not merely a devise of a freehold ·estate, but a 
disposition of leasehold, freehold, and copyhold lands. There is no doubt, that the lease-
hold estate in equity would be taken by them [the heirs], as purchasers." 
34 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840). 
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ished, rather well summarized most of the reasons which had been 
advanced when he said: 
"By whatever may be the origin of the rule, which gives 
to the heir by descent, that which the testator has intended 
to devise; whether the rule be derived from the supposed 
application of a principle that a man shall not have by gift 
that which is his own without gift, as some have supposed; 
or whether the rule be adopted for the benefit of third per-
sons, as of the lord for the preservation of tenure, or of credi-
tors for the payment of their debts; or simply as Mr. Justice 
Bayley said in Chaplin v. Leroux, because it is convenient 
that the property should be assets in the hands of the heir; 
there seems to be no reason, why, as against the heir, the rule 
should be extended further than the principle requires."35 
The first reason advanced by Lord Langdale that "a man 
shall not have by gift that which is his own without a gift" is 
intriguing and, to the writer at least, is a rather legalistic argu-
ment. Yet, strange as it may seem, we find, in essence, this same 
reason advanced in support of the position of the Restatement 
of Property relating to the exercise of a power of appointment in 
favor of a taker in default,36 which is a problem bearing a close 
similarity to the one being discussed. 
In view of the position of the Restatement that the wills branch 
of the worthier title doctrine is dead,37 and what appears by 
analogy to be .a contrary position on the exercise of a power of 
appointment in favor of a taker in default, a brief comparison 
of the two problems seems worthwhile. 
The analogous problem on powers is this: if a donee of a 
power of appointment exercises his power in favor of the person 
named by the donor as a taker in default, does the appointee take 
by appointment, or does he take in default of appointment? Sub-
ject to certain qualifications, the Restatement view is that he takes 
in default of appointment.38 Or, to put it another way, he takes 
as if no appointment had been made. In support of this position 
Professor Casner has argued, "it seems curious to say that words 
of appointment can give to the taker in default that which he 
35 49 Eng. Rep. 144 at 145. 
36 Amendments to Restatement, Proposed Final Draft No. 3-Property, p. 89 [Pro-
posed Amendments submitted by the Reporters and Advisers to the Council Meeting and 
to the Annual Meeting, June 1947]. 
37 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §314, comment on subsection (2) (1940). 
38 Id., §369. 
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already has, subject only to defeasance by appointment to another, 
which never occurs."39 To the writer, it would seem that this 
argument is in essence the identical argument advanced by Lord 
Langdale in support of the rule under discussion. 
Professors Powell and Simes, on the other hand, have 
countered, saying that the "taker in default who takes because a 
power is found not to have been exercised takes by choice of the 
donee just as truly as does an appointee selected by the donee."40 
Their argument seems sound. Furthermore, its reasoning is 
equally appropriate to rebut the legalistic argument set forth by 
Lord Langdale in support of the worthier title doctrine. 
The two other reasons advanced by Lord Langdale for the 
rule are on a much sounder footing. Indeed, it seems that the 
real reason for the origin of the doctrine lies in the tenurial 
relationship.41 When the feudal society flourished, the feudal 
incidents in favor of the lord were of considerable importance. 
These were due the lord only if the tenant were in by descent 
and not by purchase. That this was perhaps the chief reason for 
the rule is recognized by the commissioners who were appointed 
to inquire into the real property law of England. In their report 
they said, "Various reasons are assigned for these rules; one is the 
greater advantage to which lords of manors were formerly entitled, 
where their tenants acquired their estates by descent .... "42 
IV. How THE RuLE WAS APPLIED 
It was not difficult for the English common law judges to state 
the rule under discussion, for it was an established principle of 
the common law. Furthermore, no apparent difficulty was ex-
perienced in applying the rule where the limitation was in form 
to the "heirs" of the testator. But the courts were troubled and 
39 Amendments to Restatement, Proposed Final Draft No. 3-Property, p. 89 [Pro-
posed Amendments submitted by the Reporters and Advisers to the Council Meeting and 
to the Annual Meeting, June 1947]. 
40 Ibid. 
41 "This rule, that the devisee shall be in of the elder title, viz. by descent, has been 
said by some to have been adopted in favour of the heir, that he might be in of his better 
title, and, thereby, toll an entry, or have a warranty. But if that were the case, he would 
be intitled to an election to take either under the will or under the devise, as might be 
most for his advantage; but that he cannot do. The rule seems rather to have been adopted 
in favour of third persons, viz. of the lord, for the preservation of the tenure, (which was 
a valuable thing before the statute of Malbridge,) and of creditors for the preservation of 
their debts." POWELL, DEVISES 430 (1806). See also Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of Worthier 
Title Doctrine," 2- OKLA. L. REV. 131 at 138-139 (1949). 
42 FOURTII REPORT MADE To HIS MAJESTY BY TIIE COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED TO EN-
QUIRE INTO TIIE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 74 (1833). 
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encountered grave difficulty in determining when the rule applied 
where the devise was not in form to the testator's heirs, but in-
stead was to a named person or persons. 
A. A Devise to a Single Individual 
A devise to an individual by name who was the heir at law 
of the testator was the typical situation in which we find the rule 
applied. For example, here there was no question under the 
rule of primogeniture but that a devise to the eldest son consti-
tuted a devise to the heir. The devise was, therefore, void if all 
the other requirements of the rule were satisfied.43 Likewise, if 
the testator's sole heir were his daughter,44 or granddaughter,45 
or grandson,46 or any other single individual, a devise to such an 
individual was void. The rule was, therefore, sometimes over-
simplified and it was stated that "a devise to the heir is void."47 
B. A Devise to Several Persons Who Are the Heir 
Sometimes a situation arose in which it was said that several 
persons inherited land as coparceners from the ancestor if he died 
intestate. This was true if he left only daughters, or by particular 
custom all males sometimes inherited in equal degree:18 The 
question, therefore, naturally arose as to whether the rule applied 
to a devise to several individuals who constituted the heir. For 
example, suppose T died leaving only three daughters, A, B, and 
C, as his only descendants. He devised to th~m, by name, all his 
land. There was no question but that A, B, and C "put together 
make but one heir, and have but one estate among them."49 
Hence, this was a devise to the heir. However, since under the will 
they took as joint tenants and not as coparceners, it was said the 
43 Note 16 supra. 
44 Note 13 supra. 
45 Note 14 supra. 
46 Note 15 supra. 
47 Reile's Abr. 626 (1668). 
48 "An estate held in coparcenary is where lands of inheritance descend from the 
ancestor to two or more persons. It arises by common law or particular custom. By 
common law: as where a person seised in fee-simple or in fee tail dies, and his next heirs 
are two or more females, his daughters, sisters, aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in 
this case they shall all inherit, as will be more fully shown when we treat of descents 
hereafter; and those co-heirs are then called coparceners; or, for brevity, parceners only. 
(q) Parceners by particular custom are where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the 
males in equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, &:c. (r) And in either of these cases, all 
the parceners put together make but one heir, and have but one estate among them. (s)" 
2 BLACKST. COMM. 187. 
49lbid. 
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quality of the estate under the devise was different from the 
quality of the estate by descent, and the rule was held not to 
apply.50 This was also true if the devise were to A, B, and C as 
tenants in common, since by descent they would have taken as 
coparceners.51 These decisions, of course, had the effect of decided-
ly limiting the application of the doctrine, for here, even though 
the devise was to the heir, the quality of the estate was not the same 
and hence the devise was not void. Yet, admittedly, if the heir 
had been but one person, the devise would have been void. The 
only difference in the two situations was that in one instance the 
heir was one person; in the second situation, the heir was several 
persons. 
This problem apparently distressed Coke, then attorney gen-
eral, who put the problem to the court of the King's Bench,52 
for it is said that "Coke, the Queen's attorney, demanded of the 
court their opinion in this case. A man having two daughters, 
being his heirs, deviseth his land to them and their heirs, and 
dies; whether they shall take as jointenants by the devise, or as 
coparceners by consent?-and all the Justices held clearly, that 
they shall have it as jointenants, for the devise giveth it them in 
another degree than the common law would have given it them, 
and for the benefit of the survivorship between them."53 
C. A Devise to One of Several Who Together Constitute 
the Heir 
Suppose a man dies feaving as his sole and only heirs at law 
two daughters. He devises all his land to one. Is such a devise 
within the rule? This question was decided in Reading v. Raw-
sterne.54 In that case, the testator had two daughters, B and C. 
B predeceased the testator, leaving a son, D, to whom the testator 
devised his land. The question to be decided was whether D took 
one half by descent and one half by purchase, or all land by pur-
chase. The court held "that D took the whole by purchase. For 
though where the same estate is devised to the heir in quantity 
and quality, as he would have taken by descent if there had been 
50 Anonymous, Owen 65, 74 Eng. Rep. 903 (1594). See also Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 431, 
78 Eng. Rep. 671 (1595); Anonymous, Gouldsborough 141, 75 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1601). See 
also Part V-B. 
51 Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1558). 
52 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPER.TY 153 (1850). 
53 Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 431, 78 Eng. Rep. 671 at 671 (1595). 
54 2 Ld. Raym. 829, 92 Eng. Rep. 54 (1703). See also 91 Eng. Rep. 214 and 92 Eng. 
Rep. 994 Ior other reports of the same case. 
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no devise; the devise would be void, and such heir will take by 
descent, . . . yet in this case the devise was not to the heir, for 
one of the daughters, and consequently her representative, is not 
heir alone, but D. and C. were heir to the devisor, Co. Lit. 163 b. 
If a man plead a descent uni filiae et cohaeredi, it will be ill. 
Besides, if the Court hold that D. took a moiety by descent, they 
ought to hold consequently, that the devise as to the moiety was 
void, and then the said moiety ought to descend to D. and B. as 
heirs to A. [testator] and consequently D. had but three fourths of 
the lands, where they were entirely devised to him. And there-
fore this case is not within the reason of the cases cited; but of 
necessity it must be adjudged, that D. took the whole by pur-
chase."55 
This decision emphasizes the strict limits within which the 
wills branch applied. It was not applied for the simple reason 
that the devise "was not to the heir," since one of two coparceners 
"is not heir alone." In other words, this will did not come within 
the scope of the doctrine. 
This case, however, immediately suggests another question. 
Suppose A dies leaving as his sole heir his son. He devises to his 
son an undivided one-half interest in a tract of land. In a sub-
sequent paragraph of his will he devises an undivided one-half 
interest in the same tract to a stranger. Does the rule apply, or 
does the son take by purchase? The writer has found no English 
decision on the point; however, Mr. Fearne has expressed the view 
that the rule would apply.56 
55 92 Eng. Rep. 54. 
56 "In an opinion of Mr. Feame, which has been printed, he says, that a devise to 
the heir and another, as tenants in common, will not prevent the heir's taking his moiety 
by descent. For suppose a testator devises a moiety, or any other undivided share of his 
real estate, to a stranger, making no disposition of all the Temaining undivided share, 
such remaining share would of course descend to his heir at law, and he must hold it in 
common with the devisee of the undivided share devised. It was clear, therefore that an 
heir might take by descent, as tenant in common with a devisee, an undivided part of the 
estate of which his ancestor was solely seised: and it appeared to be immaterial whether 
the share he so takes is expressly devised to him, or left unnoticed by the will: for if 
expressly devised, he takes it in common; and if not noticed, he takes in the same manner; 
and a devise to two or more as tenants in common is in effect a devise of one undivided 
part to one, and of another undivided part to the other. So that under such a devise to 
an heir and a stranger as tenants in common, the heir takes as if one undivided moiety 
were devised to the stranger, and the residue to himself, that is in the same manner as 
if no disposition at all of such residue had been expressed in the will, in which case he 
would have taken by descent; and therefore the same estate being devised to him in such 
residue, as he would have taken by descent; the general rule respecting devises to an heir 
extends to it." 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 154, citing Fearne's Opin. 128. 
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V. WHAT Is THE SAME ESTATE OR INTEREST 
It has been said that "where the heir takes the same estate in 
the nature and quality which the law would give him, he takes 
by descent,"57 but if "the estate given is different in its quality 
from the estate which would have descended, there the heir shall 
take by devise .... "58 And in Doe v. Timins,5 9 the court observed, 
"In Chaplin v. Leroux this Court thought the heir took by de-
scent; the quantity and quality of estate being the same, whether 
he took by descent or devise; the quantity because in both cases 
the heir took a fee, and the quality because he took in severalty." 
The statement of the court in Doe v. Timins lays down a 
double standard; both quantity and quality of estate must be the 
same. Therefore, we should give some consideration to these 
two concepts. 
A. The English Concept of Quantity 
The quantity aspect of the rule has been the source of much 
litigation in the United States. In fact, the concept of "quantity" 
by some American courts is entirely different from the English 
concept and therein lies the reason why the rule has been found 
not to apply in many cases in the United States. "Quantity" to 
many American courts has meant the amount or proportion or 
value of the estate devised. Suppose a testator devises an undivided 
one-half interest in land in fee to one of his sons. Suppose further 
that if the testator had died intestate, his son, as one of his heirs, 
would have taken but an undivided one-fourth interest in fee. 
On the facts, some American courts have b_een quick to say that 
the "quantity" of the estate devised is not the same; hence, the 
son takes by devise.60 
The English concept of quantity did not pertain to amount, 
value, or proportion. Rather, "quantity" was a term defining the 
nature of the estate devised; that is, quantity to the English judge 
had reference to whether the heir took a fee simple, a fee tail, or 
a life estate. This was pointed out in Chaplin v. Leroux61 and in 
Doe v. Timins,62 where the court observed that the quantity of 
the estate was the same "because in both cases the heir took a fee.'' 
57 Chaplin v. Leroux, 5 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 at 959 (1816). 
58 Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759). 
59 1 B. &: Ald. 531, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 at 201 (1818). Emphasis added. 
60 For a discussion of the cases in the United States on this point, see Part XI-A infra. 
615 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816). 
621 B. &: Ald. 531, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). 
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It should be said, however, that, except in cases involving a 
charge or a condition,63 there was seldom any occasion in English 
law for the courts to consider whether a difference in amount, 
proportion, or value would so change the estate devised as to pre-
vent the application of the rule. Since the rule applied only where 
one heir at law was involved, no question concerning amount, 
proportion, or value could ever arise except in the type of situa-
tion pointed out by Mr. Fearne.64 We cannot say, therefore, that 
the English decisions are definitive on this precise problem.65 
B. The English Concept of Quality 
Since the rule did not apply unless the quality of the estate 
or the interest devised was precisely the same as that which the 
heir would have taken by descent, the question frequently arose: 
what kind of a limitation in a will so changes the quality as to 
prevent the application of the rule? 
I. The Effect of a Charge. Suppose land is devised to the 
testator's heir at law subject to a payment of a thousand dollars 
by the heir to his younger brother. Does such a charge impressed 
upon the land change the quality so as to take such a devise out 
from under the rule? The English courts had said no, 66 although 
there is one early case to the contrary.67 In other words, the 
English view was that a charge did not prevent the heir from 
taking by descent "for the tenure is not altered."68 
2. The Effect of an Executory Interest. Suppose land is de-
vised to A, the testator's sole heir at law in fee, but if he die under 
the age of twenty-one without living issue to B in fee. Does the 
executory interest over in favor of B change the quality of the 
fee simple estate devised to A so as to prevent the application of 
the rule? Or suppose land were devised to the testator's wife until 
63 For a discussion of cases involving charges and conditions, see Part V-B-1 and 2 infra. 
64 See Part IV-C supra. 
65 The writer is not alone in the view that this rule applied only in the case where 
one person was the heir. For example, see 2 MINOR, INsrITtJTFS, 4th ed., 1045 (1892). For a 
contrary view, however, see Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L. 
REv. 6'2/1 at 648 (1930). 
66 Clerk v. Smith, 1 Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Emerson v. Inchbird, 1 Ld. 
Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1'2/10, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 
(1748); Hurst v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759); Biederman v. 
Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840). Also see dictum in Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden 
458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759) and Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 
879 (1833). 
67 Brittam v. Charnock, 2 Mod.·286, 86 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1677). 
68 Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1'2/10, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748). 
464 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
the son and heir attains twenty-four years of age and then to him 
in fee. Was the quality of the estate devised to the heir the same 
as he would have taken if there had been no devise to him? 
These were troublesome problems and the early decisions were 
in conflict.69 Scott v. Scott70 was the case chiefly relied on as hold-
ing that a gift over so changed the nature of the estate devised 
to the heir as to make the rule inapplicable. In that case, the 
testator devised certain land to his eldest son, Henry, in fee, but 
should he die without issue under twenty-one, then over. A ques-
tion arose with respect to the marshaling of assets, and it was 
urged that the devise to Henry was void, and that the land should 
be treated as intestate property. The court, however, refused to 
apply the rule and held that the heir "took a different estate from 
what he would have had by descent."71 
This case was nevertheless overruled in Doe v. Timins,72 and 
the weight of authority is clearly contrary to Scott v. Scott.73 The 
latest English judicial utterances on the subject came in Man-
bridge v. Plummer,74 where it was said, "it has always been the 
established doctrine, that a charge upon an estate devised to the 
heir does not break the descent; how then will a condition operate? 
The charge partially affects the devise, the condition wholly affects 
it; and it being determined that a charge, which carries off a part, 
does not break the descent, neither does a condition, which in a 
particular event would carry off the whole, break the descent."75 
3. The Effect of a Trust. It seems to _have been held in at 
least two English cases that a devise of land to trustees, with direc-
tions to convey to a person who is heir at law of the testator, breaks 
the descent and prevents the application of the rule.'.6 In Swaine 
69 See Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555), and Hainsworth v. Pretty, 
Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602), which hold an executory interest does not prevent 
the application of the rule. Contra, Gilpins Case, Cro. Car. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 740 (1629). 
70 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759). 
71 28 Eng. Rep. 762 at 764. 
72 1 B. &: Aid. 530, 10 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). In 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 153 (1850) it 
is said that Scott v. Scott, I Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759), was "materially shaken, if 
not overruled." 
73 Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602); Chaplin v. Leroux, 
5 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816). See also Hedger v. Rowe, 3 Lev. 127, 83 Eng. Rep. 
612 (1682). 
,74 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833). 
75 39 Eng. Rep. 879 at 881. 
76 Swaine v. Burton, 15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep. 792 (1808); Davis v. Kirk, 2 K. &: J. 
391, 69 Eng. Rep. 834 (1856) .. In Davis v. Kirk, a testator devised land to trustees to pay 
the income therefrom to W for life and at her death to convey "unto such person as 
should answer the description of his heir at law." The.court held the heir at law took by 
purchase and said: "The expression 'heir at law' is somewhat strong; but, independently 
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v. Burton~ 77 the testatrix devised real and personal property in 
trust to pay the income to Joseph Welch for life, and after his 
death the trustees were to convey all of such property which had 
not been sold for the payment of debts to "the heir or heirs at 
law of her (testatrix') cousin William Cockell." William Cockell 
left five women as his heirs at law. By unusual circumstances 
these same five women were also the heirs at law of the testatrix. 
Thus, in effect, upon the death of Joseph Welch, the life tenant, 
the trustees were to convey to the testatrix' heirs at law. By the 
common law these women, if they took under the will, took as 
joint tenants with the right of survivorship, whereas, if they took 
by descent they took as coparceners. This became important, for 
one of the five died and her eldest son claimed a one-fifth part 
of the land. The other four women claimed that the land had 
been acquired by the five as joint tenants and that they as the 
survivors were entitled to it all. So the question was squarely 
raised as to whether they acquired the land as joint tenants by 
purchase or as coparceners by descent. In holding that they ac-
quired the land by purchase, Lord Chancellor Eldon said, "the 
effect of this devise is to break the descent; vesting the estates in 
the trustees; and directing them to convey to the persons de-
scribed as purchasers. . . . The devise also is, not to these heirs, 
but to trustees; and by that devise the descent is broken."78 
It should be noted, however, that in Doe v. Timins79 there 
was a devise of land in trust for .the testator's grandson and heir 
at law until he attained twenty-one, and if he does not attain 
twenty-one then over in trust to three nieces. The trust aspect 
of this case was not discussed and the court held the grandson 
took by descent. Perhaps the court was so intent on distinguish-
ing and overruling Scott v. Scott that no consideration was given 
to this point. 
of that, the fact of the testator having divested the inheritable quality of the estate by 
breaking the descent entirely, and giving the estate to trustees, and leaving them to find 
out the heir, has put them under an obligation to look upon the heir as a persona 
designata, and they cannot regard the inheritable quality of the estate, but they must find 
out the person who answers the description of heir at law of the testator." 69 Eng. Rep. 
834 at 835. This case is difficult to explain since it came down after the wills branch of 
the doctrine had been abolished by statute in England. That fact was never mentioned 
though it would appear to have been a complete answer, unless it was felt that the 
statute was incomplete and did not cover this type of a devise. 
77 15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep. 792 (1808). 
78 33 Eng. Rep. 792 at 794. See comment on this case in note to Scott v. Scott, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 762 at 764. 
79 1 B. & Ald. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). 
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4. The Effect of a Future Interest; the Effect of a Power of 
Sale. In the early case of Preston v. H olmes8° a curious argument 
was made. The testator devised land to his wife for life and, at 
her death, to his eldest son in fee. It was argued "that the son 
takes by purchase, and not by descent: for the devise is not to the 
son in present, but after the death of the testator's wife, and if he 
had the lands by descent, he should have them presently." In 
other words, counsel argued that the remainder to the heir was a 
future interest, and that if there had been no will he would have 
taken a possessory estate. The court, of course, overruled this 
contention. Indeed, many of the cases already discussed involved 
future interests, and the English courts, so far as the 1VTiter has 
been able to determine, have never refused to apply the rule 
because a future interest rather than a possessory estate was in-
volved. However, this point should be kept in mind, for it arises 
again in connection with the American decisions. 81 
Turning now to the question of a power of sale, we find this 
matter decided in Doe v. Timins.82 Here the testator devised 
land in trust for his grandson, who was his heir at law, until he 
should attain twenty-one, and if he should not attain twenty-one, 
then over. The trustee also had a power of sale. The question 
there presented was "does this power of distress and sale, and the 
executory devise over, break the descent?"83 The court concluded 
that it did not; the grandson took by descent. With the divesti-
ture charact~r of a power and th~ divestiture character of an execu-
tory interest being as similar and analogous as they are, it is diffi-
cult to see how the court could have reached any other conclusion. 
VI. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE 
The legal consequences of the rule were of considerable mag-
nitude while it obtained in England. At the English common law 
the course of descent of land was traced to the last purchaser; it, 
therefore, made a difference in many cases whether a devise to an 
heir gave him an interest by purchase or whether it was void and 
he took by descent.84 Creditors of decedents were likewise vitally 
affected, for if the decedent validly disposed of his land by will 
80Sty. 149, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648). 
81 See Part XI·D infra. 
82 I B. &: Aid. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). 
83 106 Eng. Rep. 195 at 201. 
84 Clerk v. Smith, I Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487, 
93 Eng. Rep. 651 (1721); Hurst v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 
(1759); Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833). 
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to his heir, such land could not be reached by the decedent's credi-
tors, whereas if the devise were void, it could be so reached.85 
Furthermore, the existence of the rule sometimes affected the 
rights of parties when marshaling of assets was involved.86 
VII. STATUTORY ABOLITION OF THE RULE 
In 1833 both the inter vivas and wills branches of the worthier 
title doctrine were abolished in England by statute.87 As a doc-
trine forming an integral part of the English common law and 
applied as a rule of policy, it had become purposeless. The reasons 
giving rise to its judicial birth were no more.88 Its existence caused 
much litigation and defeated otherwise legitimate intention. Hence 
the recommendation that it be abolished was well received, and 
the statute abrogating the entire doctrine resulted.89 
It is interesting to note, however, that nearly seventy years 
later a case arose in which an interpretation of the abrogating 
statute was drawn into question and a most curious problem pre-
sented itself for decision. It will be remembered that a devise 
85 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Bashpool's Case, 2 Leo. 101, 
74 Eng. Rep. 392 (1585); Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1589); Gilpin's Case, 
Cro. Eliz. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 740 (1629); Brittam v. Charnock, 2 Mod. 286, 86 Eng. Rep. 
1076 (1677); Emerson v. Inchbird, 1 Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Allam v. 
Heber, 2 Strange 1270, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748). 
86 Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759); Strickland v. Strickland, 10 
Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Rep. 659 (1839); Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 
(1840). In Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833), the court dis-
tinguishes Scott v. Scott, supra, because it principally involved a marshaling of assets. 
87 Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, §3 (1833). That portion of the statute abolishing the 
wills branch of the doctrine provides as follows: "When any land shall have been devised, 
by any Testator who shall die after the Thirty-fust day of December One thousand and 
eight hundred and thirty-three, to the Heir or to the Person who shall be the Heir of 
such Testator, such Heir shall be considered to have acquired the Land as a Devisee, and 
not by Descent. ••• " 
88 For the historical reason for the rule see Part m supra. 
89 "The Rule appears to us to be objectionable, because it creates several intrica,te 
distinctions, and has occasioned litigation among different classes of representatives. 
Where there is any difference between the estate which would pass by the devise, and the 
estate which the Heir would take by descent, he takes by force of the devise, and in some 
cases, where the devise is contingent or executory, it is not settled in which of the two 
characters the Heir will be entitled. In all cases the estate is considered to pass by the 
Will, for the purpose of exonerating the Heir from the liability he would otherwise be 
subject to, of being primarily liable for the whole of the specialty debts of the Testator, 
although it would not be held to pass by the Will, for the purpose of exonerating the 
Heir from such debts as before the passing of the late Statute could not be recovered from 
the Devisee. We also think, that where the Testator expressly devises an estate, his inten-
tion may be inferred to be that the devise should take effect. 
"We consider, therefore, that the Rule which makes the devise void in such cases, 
should be abolished, and that the Heir should take by virtue of the devise." 4 FoURTII 
REPORT MADE TO His MAJESTY BY TIIE COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND REsPECTING REAL PROPERTY 74 {1833). 
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in form to "my heirs" or "my right heirs" was accorded slightly 
different treatment by the English courts than was a devise to A, 
who turned out to be the testator's heir at law.90 That is to say, 
when the testator employed the words "heirs" or "right heirs" 
they were treated as words of limitation just as they were when 
the rule in Shelley's Case was involved or when the inter vivos 
branch of the worthier title doctrine was involved. This being 
true, the language of the statute abrogating the worthier title 
doctrine became most important, for the statute purported to 
abolish the rule only when there was a devise "To the Heir or to 
the Person who shall be the Heir of such Testator .... "91 
Nothing was said about a devise to the "heirs" or "right heirs" 
of the testator. It was, therefore, the considered judgment of Mr. 
Hayes that "the legal import of a limitation by will to the heirs 
or right heirs generally, (as distinguished from a devise to the 
individual heir) of the testator, which does not appear to be 
altered by the act is equivalent to a declaration of intestacy as 
regards the estate to which it applies."92 
Mr. Hayes' argument was urged upon the court in Owen v. 
Gibbons.93 The court, as a matter of construction, held that the 
statute applied even though the form of the limitation was to the 
testator's "own right heirs." Though this construction was at 
variance with Mr. Hayes' view, his construction would have re-
sulted in only a partial abrogation of the doctrine, and it would 
seem that since the parliament in the same statute had expressly 
abrogated the rule as to inter vivos gifts which were in form to the 
"heirs" of a grantor, it surely intended a like result when the gift 
by way of a devise was to the "heirs" or "right heirs" of the tes-
tator. It is not difficult, therefore, to see how the court, as a 
matter of construction, arrived at its decision. 
VIII. THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 1813, while speaking for the United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Story said: "It is true that the general rule is, that an heir 
shall not take by devise, when he may take the same estate in 
the land by descent."94 A few years later, when writing his Com-
mentaries, Chancellor Kent stated: "A devise to the heir at law 
90 See Part 11-B supra. 
91 See note 87 for the terms of the statute. 
92 1 HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO CONVEYANCING, 5th ed., !HS (1840). 
93 (1902] 1 Ch. 636. 
94 Barnitz's Lessee v. Robert Casey, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 456 (1813). 
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is void, if it gives precisely the same estate that the heir would 
take by descent if the particular devise to him was omitted out 
of the will. The title by descent has, in that case, precedence to 
the title by devise."95 
Does the rule of law stated by these distinguished jurists exist 
in the United States today? Dean Pound has observed that "fifty 
years is a long life for a rule, that is a legal precept that attaches 
a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed state 
of facts.'' 96 Holmes made a similar observation.97 Since the wills 
branch of the worthier title doctrine is precisely that kind of rule, 
one might expect to find it extinct after nearly 150 years of opera-
tion. Some authorities, notably the Restatement, have asserted 
that the rule alluded to by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent is 
no longer the law in the United States.98 
On the other hand, equally eminent authorities have been 
less dogmatic. Professor Simes is one who had adopted a more 
cautious and, it is submitted, a more realistic approach. He states: 
"At one time it was important to know whether land passed by 
devise or descent. But today it is impossible to see why it should 
make any difference whether a person takes the land of a decedent 
by devise or descent. Hence, although there is some authority to 
the contrary, the better view is that in so far as the worthier [title] 
doctrine is applicable to wills, it is obsolete."99 
Professor Powell has likewise declined to go along completely 
with the categoric position of the Restatement. He has stated, 
"Modern American Law has progressively eliminated these signifi-
cances of the wills branch of this rule. Consequently, the Restate-
ment of the Law of Property took the position that this branch of 
the rule is no longer a part of American law. An occasional deci-
sion nevertheless bears the imprint of the obsolete rule.''100 
Professor Casner has expressed the view that there is a "lack 
of significance in modern times of the doctrine of worthier title 
as applied to a devise to the testator's heirs."101 Writing at a 
later date, however, he fully recognizes that the rule may still 
95 4 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 5015. 
96 Pound, "Survey of Conference Problems," 14 UNIV. OF CrN. L. REv. 324 at 329 
(1940). 
97 See HOLMES, "The Path of the Law," COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 at 169 (1920). 
98 PROP.EltTY RESTATEMENT §314 (2) (1940). 
991 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.19, p. 440 (1952). 
100 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §381, p. 262 (1952). 
1015 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.56, p. 414 (1952). 
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exist and he inferentially admonishes estate planners to beware 
of its disruptive character.102 
It goes without saying that there is virtual unanimity of opin-
ion among the recognized authorities that the wills branch should 
not be the law. But to say that the wills branch is not the law 
goes a step further. It is the ·writer's view that the position of the 
Restatement is absolutely sound and correct, unless there is con-
siderable authority holding that different legal consequences do 
in fact result by applying the wills branch. It would therefore 
seem proper at the very outset to direct our attention to that-
question. For unless different legal consequences do result, ques-
tions as to how the rule is applied, how many jurisdictions have 
recognized it, and the like, are largely academic. 
IX. Do DIFFERENT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES REsuLT FROM 
APPLYING THE WILLS BRANCH? 
A. The Course of Descent 
There was a time when it was vitally important in tracing 
the course of descent of land to ascertain whether it was acquired 
by descent or purchase.103 Current legal thinking, however, is 
very generally premised on the theory that the mode of acquisi-
tion of land is wholly unimportant with respect to its future devo-
lution. One writer has said that the "problem has ceased to exist, 
since even in the few states which retain the doctrine. of ancestral 
estates, statutes uniformly include realty coming to the intestate 
by devise or gift as well as by descent."104 While this statement is 
no doubt accurate in a general sense, it is inaccurate in one im-
portant detail. This detail relates to the descent of property 
owned by a minor who dies unmarried, under age, and without 
issue. As to such a minor, statutes in several states provide that 
if the property came to the decedent by inheritance~ then it de-
scends to his surviving brothers and sisters or their issue, if any. 
If it did not come to him by inheritance-or to put it another 
way-if it came to him by purchase, it will devolve upon a surviv-
ing parent, if one survives.105 
102 CAsNER, EsrATE PLANNING 196-197 (1953). 
103 The English cases are numerous. For United States cases see, for example, Donnelly 
v. Turner, 60 Md. 81 (1883); Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Landic v. 
Simms, 1 App. D.C. 507 (1893); University v. Holstead, ·4 N.C. 289 (1816); Yelverton v. 
Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926). 
104 Comment, 46 HAR.v. L. REv. 993 at 999 (1933). 
105 The Michigan statute is typical of those which fall in this category. It provides 
_as follows: " ••• and if the intestate shall leave no issue, husband or widow, his or her 
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Statutes of this type exist in at ·1east fourteen jurisdictions.106 
Although limited in their scope they do determine the course of 
descent when the decedent dies (I) unmarried, (2) under age, 
and (3) when the decedent acquired his interest by inheritance.101 
With respect to the last requirement there is persuasive authority 
that the words "by inheritance" used in these descent and distri-
bution statutes have a well accepted technical meaning. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in construing its statute made this obser-
vation: 
"And this provision does not affect the question, unless 
'the estate came to the deceased child . . . by inheritance 
from such deceased parent.' Did the estate devised by the 
will of James Donahue, the father of the intestate, come to 
the latter by 'inheritance,' within the meaning of the statute. 
We think not. We have no doubt that the term 'inheritance' 
is used in the statute in its ordinary, well known signification. 
An estate acquired by inheritance is one that has descended 
to the heir, a~d been cast upon him by the single operation 
of law. 'Descent or hereditary succession is the title whereby 
a man, on the death of his ancestor, acquires his estate by 
right of representation as his heir at law. An heir, therefore, 
is he upon whom the law casts the estate immediately on the 
death of the ancestor; and an estate so descending to the heir 
is in law called the inlieritance.' ( ... 2 Black. Com. 241, 
294, 373, 374.) 
estate shall descend to the father and mother in equal shares, and if there be but 1 of the 
parents living, then to the survivor alone; . • • Provided, however, That if such intestate 
shall die under the age of 21 years and not having been married, all the estate that came 
to such intestate by inheritance from a parent, which has not been lawfully disposed of, 
shall descend to the other children and the issue of deceased children of the same parent, 
if there be such children or issue, and if such persons are in the same degree of kindred 
to said intestate they shall take equally, otherwise they shall take by right of representa-
tion .•• .'' Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §702.80. Italics added. 
106 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §60-1-3-4; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) §§200, 
225 and 227; Idaho Code (1948) §14-103; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 170, §1, subdiv. VII; 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §§67-1201, 91-401, 91-403; Nev. Comp. Laws (1949 Supp.) 
§9882.297; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§47-0121, 56-0101, 56-0104; Okla. Stat. (1951) §§60-331, 
84-213; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §111.020; S.D. Code (1939) §§56.0101, 56.0104; Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) §74-4-5; Wash. Rev. Code, §11.04.020; Wis. Stat. (1953) §237.01 (6). 
In Wisconsin the statute herein cited applies only if the child dies unmarried, under 
age and without surviving brothers or sisters, but with surviving issue of deceased brothers 
or sisters. In such a 915e the "estate" which came to the child "by inheritance" from his 
parent goes to the issue of deceased children of the same parent. But if the child dies 
unmarried, under age and leaves surviving brothers or sisters of the same parent, then the 
"estate" acquired by such child from his parent "by inheritance or by testamentary gift" 
goes to his surviving brothers and sisters. See note 110 infra. 
107 The California statute now uses the word "succession" instead of "inheritance.'' 
The Oregon statute uses the word "descent" in lieu of "inheritance." 
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"The estate, in this instance, was not cast upon the de-
ceased by operation of law, as the representative and heir 
of his father, but was conferred upon him by devise. The 
estate was acquired by purchase, in the technical sense of the 
term, and not by descent. It did not come to him by inheri-
tance, and should not,. therefore, have been distributed under 
the seventh subdivision of section one, but under the third, 
which gives the mother an equal share with the brothers and 
sisters. "108 
The Michigan Supreme Court has taken the same view.100 
Furthermore, based upon the Wisconsin and Minnesota statutes, 
a strong argument can be made that the words "by inheritance" 
do not include property acquired by devise. That is to say, the 
statutes in these states demonstrate the type of language the legis-
lature employs when it intends to include property which the 
decedent may have acquired by will. These statutes are unequiv-
ocal in their language. The Minnesota statute provides as follows: 
"If a minor die leaving no spouse nor issue surviving, all of his 
estate that came to him by inheritance or will from his parent 
shall descenq. and be distributed to the other children of the same 
parent, if any ... .''110 
In view of the statutes in these fourteen jurisdictions, it be-
comes apparent that the course of descent may well depend upon 
whether property is acquired by descent or purchase. Such being 
the case, the wills branch takes on obvious significance. This fact 
was pointed out in Cordon v. Gregg.111 There the Supreme Court 
of Oregon was faced with these facts: the testator had devised 
certain real and personal property in trust to be paid over to his 
son when he arrived at age twenty-one. His son was the testator's 
sole heir at law. Two months after the testator's death, his son 
died, being seventeen years old, unmarried, and without issue. 
108 Estate of Donahue, 36 Cal. 329 at 332 (1868). See also Larrabee v. Tracy, !19 Cal. 
App. (2d) 593, 104 P. (2d) 61 (1940). 
109 The words "by inheritance" were of particular significance in Jenks v. Trowbridge 
Estate, 48 Mich. 94 (1882). In commenting on the technical meaning of these words, the 
Supreme Court later, in referring to the opinion in the Jenks case, said: "It gave to the 
words 'by inheritance' used in the statute their technical legal meaning, as having ref-
erence only to the descent of real estate." In re Dodge's Estate, 242 Mich. 156 at 159, 218 
N.W. 798 (1928). 
110 Minn. Stat. (1953) §525.16 (5). The Wisconsin statute speaks of "all the estate that 
came to the deceased child by inheritance or by testamentary gift . •.• " Wis. Stat. (1953) 
§237.0I (5). Italics added. 
111164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d) 732, rehearing granted, IOI P. (2d) 414 (1940), noted in 
20 ORE. L. R.Ev. 164 (1941). 
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The son's heir at law was his mother, who was the divorced wife 
of the testator. The Oregon descent and distribution statute pro-
vided as follows: 
"3. If the intestate shall leave no lineal descendants, 
neither husband, nor wife, nor father, such property shall 
descend to his or her mother; . . . 
"5. When any child shall die under the age of 21 years 
and leave no husband nor wife nor children, any real estate 
which descended to such child shall descend to the heirs of the 
ancestor from which such real property descended the same 
as if such child died before the death of such ancestor." 
The wills branch was strongly urged to defeat the claim of the 
testator's divorced wife. That is to say, counsel argued that the 
devise by the testator to his heir at law came within the wills 
branch and, therefore, he took by descent and not by purchase; 
accordingly the land "descended to such child" as provided in 
subdivision 5 of the statute. 
On its first hearing the court expressly declined and refused 
to apply the wills branch, although the precise reasons for its 
refusal are not entirely clear. Nevertheless, the court held that 
the word "descended" included real property devised by the will 
and, therefore, held against the testator's divorced wife. On rehear-
ing, however, the court reversed its former position and held the 
wills branch fully applicable. In so doing the court made this 
pertinent observation: 
" . . . We are now convinced that the common-law rule 
above referred to has not been changed or abrogated by the 
statute and that such rule, although never heretofore an-
nounced in any decision of this court, we think is binding 
upon the courts of this state like any other applicable com-
mon-law rule which has not been abrogated by statute. . . . 
That rule is stated by Blackstone as follows: '. . . But if a 
man, seised in fee, devises his whole estate to his heir at law, 
so that the heir takes neither a greater nor a less estate by 
the devise than he would have done without it, he shall be ad-
judged to take by descent, even though it be charged with 
incumbrances; this being for the benefit of creditors and 
others, who have demands on the estate of the ancestor. 1 
Chitty, Bl. Comm., *242.' "112 
Under similar statutes the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire have clearly recognized that if the wills 
112164 Ore. 306 at 316, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940). 
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branch is found to be applicable113 different legal consequences 
will result.11 4 Thus the course of descent may well be affected in 
those jurisdictions having statutes of the type herein discussed. 
B. The Rights of Creditors 
Recent decisions unequivocally show that cr_editors' rights may 
be determined by the application of the wills branch. This is 
demonstrated by Rossiter v. Soper.115 In that case the testatrix 
devised land to her sister and husband in the exact shares they 
would have taken as her heirs at law had she died intestate. Sub-
sequent to the probate of her will, this land was sold through a 
probate proceeding to pay some of the decedent's debts. A sub-
sequent purchaser of an undivided interest in the land sought to 
partition it and joined the decedent's husband as a defendant. To 
defeat the partition suit and the probate sale proceedings, the 
husband argued that the land was homestead and that he had 
not waived his homestead nor consented in writing to the sale of 
such interest. 
The purchaser at the sale argued that his homestead interest 
was extinguished because he failed to renounce the provisions 
made for him in the will and that, failing to renounce, both he 
and decedent's sister "became the owners of the property, under 
the will, as tenants in common, subject to the debts of the 
estate."116 Under Illinois law, if the spouse accepts the terms of 
a will it constitutes a waiver of the homestead.117 In holding that 
the husband had not waived his homestead the court said: 
"It may be noted in this connection, that the will was void 
and wholly inoperative. It devised to the surviving husband 
and sister of the testatrix, who were her only heirs, the same 
interests which they would take by descent had she died in-
testate. . . . They, therefore took under the statute by de-
scent, and not under the will. . . . The fact that appellant 
did not renounce the will can have no bearing whatever on 
the issues in this case. . . . He took nothing under the will. 
113 For a discussion of how and when the ,\Tills branch is applied, see Part XI infra. 
J.14 Sedglvick v. Minot, 6 Allen (88 Mass. 171) (1863); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 
391 (1828), See also Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837), where the wills 
branch was applied with different legal consequences resulting as to the devolution of 
property under the Tennessee descent and distribution statute. It should be noted that 
the language of the statute in both Massachusetts and New Hampshire has been changed 
since these cases were decided. 
115 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943). 
116 Id. at 49. 
117 Stubblefield v. Howard, 348 Ill. 20, 180 N.E. 410 (1932). 
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He was wholly unaffected by the will. His failure to renounce 
the will did not affect his right of homestead. Having receiv-
ed nothing under the will, he received nothing in lieu of his 
right of homestead. . . . There was nothing on which a find-
ing could be based that he had waived his homestead by not 
renouncing the will. "118 
It can thus be seen that the court was quick to use the wills 
branch to put to rest the argument that the decedent's husband 
had waived his homestead by electing to take under the will. If 
the will was void so far as he was concerned, it was impossible for 
him to waive his homestead by electing to accept its terms.119 
Another point should not be overlooked. This case may be 
determinative on the question of whether dower is barred. If the 
dispositive provisions of a will are void because of the wills branch, 
then presumably the will would not have the effect of barring 
dower as provided by statute.120 In fact, the· court said that the 
"surviving husband was also entitled to dower in the one-half 
interest which descended to the sister of the deceased, under the 
Descent Act in force at the time of her death."121 
Let us now tum to a second situation where the wills branch 
may be significant in determining the rights of creditors. There 
is a line of American cases which hold that a person may renounce 
a devise in his favor even though by so doing he defeats the claims 
of his creditors.122 Contrariwise, there is respectable authority that 
an heir taking by descent is powerless to renounce and, therefore, 
is in no position to place his assets beyond the reach of his credi-
tors.123 That being the state of the law, it immediately becomes 
important whether an heir at law takes by descent or purchase. 
118 Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47 at 49-50, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943). Illinois has now 
abolished the rule. See Part XII infra. 
119 For a similar decision see Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890). 
120 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, §172, provides: "Any will, whether or not it contains any 
provision for the benefit of the testator's surviving spouse, bars the right of the surviving 
spouse to elect to take dower in all real estate of the testator, unless otherwise expressed 
in the will or unless the will is renounced by the surviving spouse in the manner provided 
in Section 17.'' 
121384 Ill. 47 at 49, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943). 
122 "The largest group of cases involving the right of an heir to renounce have been 
decided with regard to the claims of creditors. As we have seen, it is well established that 
a legatee may renounce a bequest in his favor. He may take such action even though he 
is a bankrupt at the time and his renunciation defeats the just claims of his creditors." 
Lauritzen, "Only God Can Make an Heir," 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 568 at 575 (1953), and 
the cases cited. Cf. comment in MODEL PROBATE CODE §58, which states in part: "The 
common law is not clear as to whether the devisee is able to defeat the rights of creditors 
and taxing authorities." 
128 Bostian v. Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. (2d) 797 (1946); In re Meyer's 
Estate, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 799, 238 P. (2d) 597 (1951); annotation in 170 A.L.R. 435 
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The importance of this problem was pointed out in the recent 
case of McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig.124 In that case a widow 
devised land to her three sons, A, B, and C, who were her heirs 
at law. A's creditor sought to attach A's interest in the land. To 
thwart these efforts, A executed an instrument which he contended 
was a renunciation of the will. The creditor countered by urging 
the application of the wills branch, saying that A took by descent 
and not by purchase. The court recognized the decisive nature of 
this contention125 and clearly recognized that if "he takes by descent 
he cannot renounce his interest so as to defeat his creditors."126 
However, after a full discussion of the wills branch, the court 
decided it should not be applied because the devise to A was not 
of the same quality and quantity as he would have taken by 
descent.127 That is to say, since there was a legacy of $500 to a 
sister, who was not an heir at law of the testatrix, and because of 
the question concerning an advancement, A would not take under 
the will an estate of the same value as if the testatrix had died 
intestate, and hence the estate was of different quality and quan-
tity.12s . 
But suppose there is no difference in quality and quantity and 
hence no basis for finding that the doctrine cannot apply. Sup-
pose T devises Blackacre to A, his son and only heir. The residue 
of his estate, real and personal, he devises to B Charity. At T's 
death, however, suppose Blackacre is his only asset so that by any 
test A will necessarily receive an estate of the same quantity and 
quality under the will as he would have received if his father had 
died intestate. Thus if A is in by descent 'because of the wills branch 
he cannot renounce and his creditors cari reach Blackacre. On 
the other hand, if A takes as a devisee under the will and re-
nounces, Blackacre would go to B Charity under the residuary 
clause and A's creditors could not reach it. In other words, differ-
ent legal consequences may result because of the application of 
(1947). See also Lauritzen, "Only God Can Make an Heir," 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 568 at 
575 (1953), where he says: "On the other hand, it is equally well settled that an heir can 
not defeat his creditors in this way, because he has no power to renounce." 
124 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W. (2d) 197 (1939), noted in 16 TENN. L. REv. 358 (1940). 
125 Id. at 442: "The first proposition to be considered is whether Lawrence Hirsig 
held his interest in the estate, if any, as devisee or by inheritance, as the solution of this 
question will greatly aid in determining whether he has any interest. If he holds the same 
estate by devise that the law casts on him by descent, he is in by descent and not by devise. 
Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 10 Yerg., 444." Italics added. 
126 Id. at 442. 
121 Id. at 443. 
128 For a discussion as to the proper test in applying the doctrine, see Part XI-A and 
B infra. 
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the wills branch. Moreover, the argument in favor of applying 
the wills branch in this kind of fact situation is an appealing one. 
It operates to the benefit of a group of persons favored by the law. 
Indeed, the fact that the rule operated in favor of creditors at the 
common law is said to be one of the reasons for its early ex-
istence.129 
A third situation of significance arises in Iowa where the wills 
branch flourishes with vigor.130 The Iowa homestead statute pur-
ports to make a homestead which "descends to the issue" exempt 
from antecedent debts of both the parent and the issue.131 The 
clear import of the Iowa decisions is that an heir132 who takes by 
purchase does not take the homestead free from his own antece-
dent debts, although such is the case if he takes by descent.133 In 
other words, if the wills branch applies, an heir gets the protection 
of the statute; if he takes under the will, he does not. 
C. Construction Problems 
I. Conditions in Restraint of Marriage. From ancient times 
conditions in wills in restraint of marriage have been looked upon 
with disfavor.134 General conditions of this nature are said to be 
contrary to public policy and void. That is to say, the condition 
may be disregarded by the beneficiary in the will without fear of 
losing the property so devised to him. 
On the other hand, limitations have been treated differently. 
For example, a devise to W so long as she remains unmarried has 
129 See Part III supra. 
130 See Part IX-D infra on the Iowa cases dealing with the lapse statute. 
131 Iowa Code (1954) §561.18: "Descent. If there be no survivor, the homestead 
descends to the issue of either husband or wife according to the rules of aescent, unless 
otherwise directed by will." §561.19: "Exemption in hands of issue. Where the homestead 
descends to the issue of either husband or wife the same shall be held by such issue 
exempt from any antecedent debts of their parents or their own, e.'Ccept those of the 
owner thereof contracted prior to its acquisition." 
132 The "heir" must also be "issue." 
133 Moninger & Ringland v. Ramsey, 48 Iowa 368 (1878); First Nat. Bank v. Willie, 
115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901); Rice v. Burkhart, 130 Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906); 
Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439,239 N.W. 692 (1931). Curiously enough, notwithstanding 
the language of the statute, it appears that the issue take the homestead free from the 
ancestor's debts whether they take by descent or purchase. See In re Guthrie's Estate, 183 
Iowa 851 at 858, 167 N.W. 604 (1918). "Whether such issue takes it free also from liability 
for his own debts is made, by our decisions in Rice v. Burkhart •.. and Voris v. West ••. , 
to depend, first, upon the fact as to whether title passes by descent or purchase; and sec-
ond, whether the ancestor did or did not leave a surviving spouse .•. :• Emphasis added. 
See also Voris v. West, 180 Iowa 138, 162 N.W. 836 (1917). 
134 Browder, "Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage," 39 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
1288 (1941). 
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not been viewed as a condition but rather as a limitation. If W 
marries there is an automatic termination of her estate. 
It can thus be seen that it becomes important in some cases 
to det~rmine whether the devise is on "condition" or a "limita-
tion." But this is most difficult to do and the cases give us no 
answer, for words normally importing a condition have been 
construed as a limitation -and vice versa.135 Furthermore, as Pro-
fessor Browder has said, the "nadir of chaos is reached in those 
cases where it has been held that the presence of a gift over turns 
a condition into a limitation."136 
It is at this "nadir of chaos" that the wills branch becomes sig-
nificant. That is to say, the gift over converts the condition into 
a limitation only if the gift over is valid. Suppose, therefore, that 
T devises land to A in fee on the condition that she not marry 
and if she marries, then "to the testator's heirs at law." Because 
the gift over to the testator's heirs at law is said to be void under 
the wills branch, it has been held that the "condition" will not 
be converted to a "limitation."137 
2. Failure of the Succeeding Interest. Turning now to a 
second type of construction problem, suppose T devises the resi-
due, consisting of land, to A in fee but if A die without leaving 
any children surviving him, then over to B in fee. Assume B is 
the sole and only heir at law of T. If the devise to B is void 
because it violates the wills branch does it leave the fee absolute 
in A even though he dies without surviving children? Or, does 
it leave a possibility of reverter in B as the testator's sole heir at 
law? No direct American authority has been found on this ques-
tion with respect to the wills branch. There are American cases 
on this point with respect to the inter vivas branch. In those 
cases where the attempted executory interest was to the grantor's 
"heirs at law" it has been held that the end limitation is void 
in so far as it designates purchasers but there is a possibility of 
reverter in the grantor.138 These cases certainly ought to be per-
suasive. If we assume that this same conclusion would also be 
reached in the wills cases, then we might properly ask: does i~ 
make any difference whether the heir takes an executory interest 
135 Id. at 1315, and the cases cited. 
136 Id. at 1315. 
137 Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810). 
138 Coomes v. Frey, 141 Ky. 740, 133 S.W. 758 (1911); In re Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa. 
439, 153 A. 739 (1931). See also SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §27 (1951). 
1956] WORTHIER TITLE DOCTRINE 479 
under the will or a possibility of reverter by descent? The answer, 
of course, is yes in those jurisdictions which hold possibilities 
of reverter to be inalienable.139 
A slight variation of the same problem arises in connection with 
the rule against perpetuities. For example, suppose T devises his 
residue, consisting of land, to X Church in fee but, if X Church 
ever ceases to teach the Apostles' Creed as a part of its doctrine, 
then to the testator's heirs at law. The orthodox view of this 
limitation, leaving aside for the moment the effect of the wills 
branch, would be that the executory interest to the heirs at law 
is void because it violates the rule against perpetuities. In such a 
situation it is almost universally held in the United States that 
the failure of the succeeding interest leaves the prior interest abso-
lute.140 In other words, X Church would have a fee simple absolute. 
However, in Sears v. Russell141 it was suggested that if the 
executory interest to the testator's heirs at law was void because 
of the wills branch, this would prevent the application of the rule 
against perpetuities. That is to say, it could be argued that the 
wills branch renders the end limitation void only so far as desig-
nating the heirs as purchasers, thereby giving X Church a fee 
simple determinable and thus leaving a possibility of reverter in 
the testator's heirs at law. Accordingly, it can be seen that if by 
applying the wills branch a court thereby precludes itself from 
applying the rule against perpetuities, with the corresponding 
result that the prior interest is rendered determinable instead of 
absolute, the difference in legal consequences is obvious. 
3. The Strange Case of Horton v. Cronley. If there is doubt 
concerning the weird nature of some decisions involving the wills 
branch, we need only consider the recent case of Horton v. Cron-
ley.142 In that case the Oklahoma Supreme Court had before it 
these facts: H and W had executed a joint will. It purported to 
dispose of all property, real and personal, to the survivor "during 
the remainder of their life." On the death of both H and W the 
property was devised "one-half of estate equally to living brothers 
and sisters" of H, and "one-half of estate equally to living brothers 
139 Illinois, by statute, makes a possibility of reverter inalienable by deed or by will. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §37b. See also Pure Oil Co. v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Co., 
376 Ill. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) 854, 135 A.L.R. 567 (1941); North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 
N.E. 267 (1908). 
140 SIMES, FtrrURE INTERESTS §96 (1951), and cases cited. 
141 74 Mass. 86 (1857). 
142 (Okla. 1953) 270 P. (2d) 306. 
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and sisters" of W. H died first and the will was probated as his 
will by W. In the petition for probate W asserted that she was the 
"sole devisee and legatee, there being no children of their mar-
riage, and that all of the property of the estate was acquired during 
their married life by their joint industry and, therefore, she be-
came the sole owner . thereof. "143 Pursuant to her petition the 
county court distributed all the property to her. Thereafter W 
died devising all her property to her brothers and sisters. H's 
brothers and sisters filed suit to establish title to one-half of the 
assets in her estate. 
It was argued that by probating H's will and by her conduct 
with respect thereto W had elected to take under the will rather 
than as a forced heir. In rejecting this contention, the court said: 
"Under the Worthier Title Doctrine it must be presumed 
that Henrietta took as a forced heir, rather than under the 
will. However, plaintiffs contend that Henrietta took under 
the will and therefore asserts that she and the defendants are 
estopped from contending that she could revoke the conjoint 
will. The fallacy of this position is demonstrated by the lan-
guage of the will itself, as under the will she could only receive 
a life estate. If she took under the will, the decree would have 
vested in her a life estate only, but, as we have seen, the de-
cree vested in her a full fee simple title. If Henrietta took 
under the will as the sole legatee, then it follows that under 
subdivision 3 of the will that one-half of the estate must go 
to the living brothers and sisters of Ben and Henrietta, has 
no application. [sic] The law presumes that Henrietta took 
the Worthier Title which, under the law of succession, she 
was entitled to. She received no benefit under the conjoint 
will which at most could have given her a life estate. $he 
elected to exercise her statutory right and took a fee simple 
title under the laws of succession."144 
This writer does not pretend to know what the court meant. 
The opinion is directly contrary to the normal approach. Fre-
quently courts go far in seeking reasons not to apply the wills 
branch. Here the reverse is true. It is believed, therefore, that 
this case cannot be squared with any orthodox concept of the 
wills branch.145 It would seem that the court is holding that W 
took as a forced heir by descent against the will, "rather than 
under the will;" and to buttress that position the court somehow 
143 Id. at 308. 
144 Id. at 313. 
145 See the dissenting opinion by Williams, J., ibid. 
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relies on the worthier title doctrine. This decision is especially 
difficult to understand in view of the court's refusal to apply the 
wills branch only a short time before in a case which afforded 
some logical basis at least for its application.146 
D. Lapse Statutes Affected by the Wills Branch 
Notwithstanding its severe criticism for doing so,147 the Iowa 
Supreme Court has steadfastly recognized and applied the wills 
branch in numerous cases involving the Iowa lapse statute.148 
That statute provides in part as follows: "If a devisee die before 
the testator, his heirs shall inherit the property devised to him, 
unless from the terms of the will a contrary intent is manifest."149 
The wills branch plays its vital part by manifesting the "con-
trary intent" so as to prevent the lapse statute from applying. Here 
is the setting frequently found: W dies leaving a will devising to 
her husband H "such share of my estate as he is entitled to and 
would receive under the laws of the State of Iowa." H prede-
ceases the testatrix leaving four children by a former marriage. 
They claim his share under the lapse statute. The testatrix' chil-
dren by a former marriage claim the whole estate. Who should 
prevail? 
How can the wills branch possibly determine this question? 
The answer is to be found in a curious piece of reasoning. It 
runs like this: If H had survived W he would have taken nothing 
under the will as a purchaser, but would have taken by descent 
since the title by descent is more worthy than the title by pur-
chase. If H, as surviving husband, would have taken nothing 
under the will, how can his children occupy any better position 
than he? They cannot, says the Iowa Supreme Court, because 
the wills branch, which the testator is presumed to know as part 
of the law, furnishes the "manifest contrary intent" to prevent the 
statute from applying.150 It can thus be seen that but for the wills 
branch this ingenious argument could not · be made and title 
would pass to H's children under the lapse statute. 
146 Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951). 
147 Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 !LI.. L. REv. 627 at 649 et 
seq. (1930); notes: 39 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1953); 46 HARV. L. REv. 993 at 998 (1933); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §312, comment j (1940). 
148 The Iowa Supreme Court refers to this statute as the "antilapse" statute. 
149 lowa Code (1954) §633.16. 
150 Tennant v. Smith, 173 Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915); Herring v. Herring, 187 
Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931). 
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Litigation in Iowa involving this question has been consider-
able. Yet to apply the doctrine seems most distasteful to the 
supreme court. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the 
court has gone to great lengths in finding the doctrine to be in-
applicable.151 In a recent case the court's displeasure with the rule 
was evidenced when it refused to apply it to a will which in fact 
gave the surviving spouse, had she survived the testator, exactly 
the same estate that she would have taken under the statute of 
descent and distribution. But because the will did not say "that 
share of my estate which my wife is entitled to receive under the 
laws of Iowa," the court refused to apply the wills branch, saying, 
we "cannot expand its purpose further. The antilapse statute 
was enacted to do away with the common law rule under which 
the heirs of a devisee could derive no benefit from the devise if 
the devisee predeceased the testator. We are unwilling to mini-
mize the operation of the statute by any further extension of the 
'worthier title' doctrine."152 
Though obviously antagonistic toward the doctrine and with 
an ear to the ground for arguments against it, there is no doubt 
but that the Iowa Supreme Court recognizes it as the law. In its 
most recent decision on the subject the court held that "the will 
gives the widow the same portion of testator's estate as though he 
had died intestate. Cons~quently, the 'worthier title' rule is 
applicable and the estate passes to her under the statutes of 
descent and distribution and not under the will."153 
E. Miscellaneous Questions Affected by the Wills Branch 
1. Priority of Assets. As a general rule intestate assets will 
be resorted to before testate assets in satisfying the claims of 
creditors or in paying specific legacies. If, therefore, property 
passes by descent because of the wills branch rather than by pur-
chase under the will, it will be taken first. So hold the American 
cases.154 An English decision is directly to the contrary.155 
151 In re Watenpaugh's Will, 192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922); In re Davis' Estate, 
204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Wehrman v. Farmers and Merchants Savings Bank, 
221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935); In re Schroeder's Estate, 228 Iowa 1198, 293 N.W. 492 
(1940); In re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); Beem v. Beem, 241 
Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); In re Coleman's 
Estate, 242 Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. (2d) 517 (1951). 
152 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247 at 256, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950). 
153 In re Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa 920 at 930, 54 N.W. (2d) 433 (1952), 36 A.L.R. (2d) 
139. 
154 Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864). 
155 Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840). 
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The English case reasons that the rule making intestate assets 
first available to creditors is premised on the theory that this is in 
accordance with the presumed intention of the · testator. If the 
will evinces a contrary intention, then other assets must bear their 
pro rata share of the debts. Therefore, if the testator devises land 
to his heir it clearly must "have been his intention that the 
devisee, who is heir, should partake of his bounty as well as other 
devisees." The court consequently held that the heir's land would 
only bear the debts ratably with assets devised to others. 
The English case is obviously better reasoned, yet the Supreme 
Court of Maryland, while expressing "great respect for the very 
able judge who delivered the opinion in the case of Biederman 
v. Seymour" specifically rejected it.156 It is believed that there 
are no American cases-at least the writer has found none-
following the English view.157 
2. Pleadings. Some states have statutes which permit a spe-
cial demurrer for misjoinder of parties.158 In the absence of such 
a statute there is some authority at least to the effect that mis-
joinder of parties may be raised by a general demurrer.159 Many 
states also have statutes which provide that only "interested 
persons" may contest the probate of a will.160 Under such cir-
cumstances the Indiana Supreme Court has held that an heir 
who takes by descent rather than by purchase under the will is 
not an "interested person" and if he joins with others to contest the 
will, it makes the petition subject to demurrer as to all plaintiffs.161 
Accordingly, it has been said that "a will which makes no other 
disposition of property than the law would make is a nullity, and 
not subject to contest."162 
F. Conclusions 
What conclusions may properly be drawn as to whether differ-
ent legal consequences result because of the wills branch? To the 
156 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864). 
1117 In accord, see note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 993 at 998 (1933), where it is said: "American 
courts, however, have failed to perceive and accept the sound reasoning of Biederman v. 
Seymour." 
1118 CLARK, CoDE PLEADING §57 (1947). 
1119 Railroad Co. v. Priest, 131 Ind. 413, 31 N.E. 77 (1892); Wells &: Nellegar Co. v. 
Short, 49 Ind. App. 296, 97 N.E. 183 (1912); Cohen v. Ottenheimer, 13 Ore. 220, 10 P. 20 
(1886). 
160 See, for example, Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) c. 58, §§29 and 61. 
161 Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909). 
162 Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912). 
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,\Triter it seems that two general conclusions may be drawn. First, 
there are numerous decisions in the United States where different 
legal consequences did in fact result because the rule was applied. 
Second, there are several distinct fact situations where different 
legal consequences may result if the rule is applied. 
In drawing these conclusions it is not the intention of the "\\Triter 
to be critical in any way of the position taken by the Restatement. 
In support of the Restatement's position it must be recognized 
that there are numerous cases in which it makes no difference 
whatsoever whether the heir takes by descent or pu;chase.163 The 
Restatement is certainly warranted in taking the position it has 
with respect to those cases. 
But what about the cases where it does make a difference? 
The Restatement specifically discusses some of the problems pre-
sented by those cases. First it discusses the question of the devo-
lution of property being determined by whether it was acquired 
by descent or purchase. While recognizing its importance at one 
time, the Restatement concludes that in modern law "it is no 
longer of any significance."164 It is the "\\Tl'iter's belief, however, 
that it may be significant and even determinative under the stat-
utes and cases previously discussed.1611 
On the second problem which is discussed, the Restatement 
says that it "has been suggested that the rule . . . is significant 
today where the question involved is the order in which the assets 
of a decedent will be'used to pay debts." But it concludes that 
the order in which assets are to be used to pay debts is subject 
"to control by the manifest intent of the deceased. The fact 
that the deceased has attempted to make a devise to his heirs 
shows an intention on his part to attach to the interest which the 
heirs may take the consequence of a devise .... Thus the rule 
that a testator cannot make a devise to his own heirs is of no sig-
nificance in the solution of these problems."166 
The foregoing argument is compelling, sound and reasonable. 
It is supported by English authority, but the '\\Triter has been 
unable to find any cases in the United States taking that positioJ.?-.167 
163 Henry v. Griffith, 242 Ala. 598, 7 S. (2d) 560 (1942); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill. 
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920); In re Shum.way's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, 160 N.W. 595 (1916); 
Brittin v. Karrenbrock, (Mo. App. 1945) 186 S.W. (2d) 35; Burton v. Kinney, 191 Tenn. 
I, 231 S.W. (2d) 356 (1950). 
164PROPERTY REsTATE!IIENT §314, comment j at·l787 (1940). 
165 See Part IX-A supra. 
166 PROPERTY REsTATE!IIENT §314, comment j at 1787 (1940). 
_167 See Part IX-A-I supra. 
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Finally, attention is directed in the Restatement to the cases 
involving the Iowa lapse statute. The Restatement position is 
this: to say that the wills branch could affect the construction of 
a lapse statute is a "fallacy ... easily illustrated." The fallacy 
is that the word "devisee" or "legatee" as used in the lapse statute 
must mean purported devisee or legatee. Secondly, lapse statutes 
"are preeminently concerned with the type of case which involves 
a devise to the testator's heirs and to rule out such cases from the 
lapse statutes would frequently nullify the significance of such 
statutes. Thus it is clear that the application of lapse statutes in 
no way depends on whether the heirs, had they survived, would 
have taken by descent or by the devise."168 
The writer is fully in accord with the argument of the Restate-
ment. It ably points up the fallacies in letting the wills branch 
affect the construction of a lapse statute. No court should con-
sider the wills branch in deciding how to construe a lapse statute. 
But one Supreme Court has done so and many people who nor-
mally would have taken under the lapse statute have been cut 
out.109 
In support of its position that the wills branch is not an exist-
ing rule of law, the Restatement concludes: "In the absence of any 
discoverable circumstance in which the rule that a devise to the 
heirs of the testator is a nullity has significance in the solution of 
modern problems, the rule stated in subsection (2) is justifiable."170 
From this conclusion the writer must respectfully dissent, but in 
so doing he wishes to make his position unequivocally clear. He 
does not wish to be understood as saying, "I am right and the 
Restatement is wrong." For after all, as Professor Simes has so 
aptly observed, the Restatement is "the 'standard of perfection' in 
this field of law."171 Furthermore, it has been the writer's pleasure 
to know and study under some of those esteemed scholars who 
worked on the Restatement, and for them he has the highest re-
gard. Therefore, it is suggested that the difference in viewpoint 
is twofold: first, all of the cases discussed in this article had not 
been reported in 1940,172 and second, as to those cases which were 
reported in 1940 there is an honest difference of opinion con-
cerning what they held and how they should be interpreted. 
168 PROPERTY RFsrATEMENT §314, comment j at 1788 (1940). 
169 See Part IX-D supra. 
170PROPERTY RFsrATEMENT §314, comment j at 1788 (1940). 
171 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTs, Preface, v (1951). 
172 The year volume 3 of the Property Restatement was published. 
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X. THE EXTENT OF RECOGNITION OF THE DOCTRINE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Inasmuch as it seems reasonable to conclude that different 
legal consequences may result by applying the rule, the next ques-
tion is:- to what extent has the rule been recognized? For if the 
rule has been expressly recognized in a given jurisdiction, that 
fact alone may be vital. That is, if a case arises with the wills 
branch being a decisive issue, counsel urging its application will 
always point to such decisions, if there are any, in support of their 
arguments. They will have the advantage of urging a doctrine 
which their own courts have recognized as a common law prin-
ciple. And this is so even though their own courts may not have 
applied the rule in a manner so as to bring about different legal 
consequences. 
Although several cases recognized the rule at an earlier 
date,173 it was perhaps largely due to the writings of Chancellor 
Kent and the publication of the fourth volume of his Commen-
taries in 1830 that numerous states have recognized the rule.174 
The writer has found decisions in twenty-one jurisdictions where 
the wills branch has been recognized. These jurisdictions in-
clude Alabama,175 Connecticut,176 Illinois,177 Indiana,178 Iowa,179 
173 Barnitz's Les.5ee v. Robert Casey, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 455 (1813); Parsons v. Win-
slow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Campbell v. Herron, 
1 N.C. 468 (1801); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816); M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C. 
209 (1819); Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio 395 (1824). 
174 For example, the following cases either quote the rule from Chancellor Kent or cite 
him in connection therewith. Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 21 P. 288 (1889); Stilwell v. 
Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); In 
re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Ellis v. Page, 51 Mass. 161 (1851); 
Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 
P. (2d) 668 (1951). 
175 Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. 169, 185 S. 897 (1938) (dictum in a deed case). 
176 Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898). 
177 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 III. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Akers v. Clark, 184 III. 136, 
56 N.E. 296 (1900) (dictum in a deed case); Darst v. Swearingen, 224 III. 229, 79 N.E. 635 
(1906); Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 III. 611, 69 N.E. 804 (1904); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 
Ill. 362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920); Cooper v. Martin, 308 III. 224, 139 N.E. 68 (1923); McCor-
mick. v. Sanford, 318 Ill. 544, 149 N.E. 476 (1925); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 III. 47, 50 N.E. 
(2d) 701 (1943); McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 III. 391, 59 N.E. (2d) 811 (1945); Boldenweck. v. 
City Nat. Bank &: Trust Co., 343 III. App. 569, 99 N.E. (2d) 692 (1951). 
178 Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 (1881); 
Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E .. 310 (1889); Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 
23 N.E. 519 (1890); McClanahan v. Williams, 136 Ind. 30, 35 N.E. 897 (1893); Rawley v. 
Sanns, 141 Ind. 179, 40 N.E. 674 (1895); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 
(1909); Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912); Dillman v. Fulwider, 57 
Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E. 124 (1914). 
179 First Nat. Bank v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901); Rice v. Burkhart, 130 
Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906); Tennant v. Smith, 173 Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915); 
Herring v. Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919); In re Schultz's Estate, 192 Iowa 
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Maine,180 Maryland,181 Massachusetts,182 Mississippi,183 New 
Hampshire,184 New York,185 North Carolina,186 Ohio,187 Okla-
homa,188 Oregon,189 Pennsylvania,100 South Carolina,191 Tennes-
see,192 Virginia,193 Wisconsin,194 and the District of Columbia.195 
The wills branch has been repudiated and found to be inappli-
cable in Kentucky196 and Georgia.197 
436, 185 N.W. 24 (1921); In re Watenpaugh's Will, 192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922); 
In re Davis' Estate, 204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439, 
239 N.W. 692 {1931); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Wehrman 
v. Farmers and Merchants Savings Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935); In re $heeler's 
Estate, 226 Iowa 650, 284 N.W. 799 (1939); In re Schroeder's Estate, 229 Iowa 1198, 293 
N.W. 492 (1940); In re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); In re 
Finch's Estate, 239 Iowa 1069, 32 N.W. (2d) 819 (1948); Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41 
N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); In re Coleman's Estate, 242 
Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. {2d) 517 (1951); In re Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa 920, 54 N.W. (2d) 433, 
36 A.L.R. (2d) 139 (1952). 
180 Lord v. Bourne, 63 Me. 368, 18 Am. Rep. 234 (1873). 
181 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864); Donnelly v. Turner, 60 Md. 81 (1883); 
Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896). 
182Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); 
Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Sears v. Russell, 74 Mass. 86 (1857); Sedgwick v. Minot, 
88 Mass. 171 (1863); Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 83 N.E. 880 (1908); Nat. 
Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944) (dictum in an inter 
vivos trust case). 
183 McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 417, I S. 356 (1887). 
184 M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828). 
185 In re Hawes' Estate, 162 App. Div. 173, 147 N.Y.S. 329 (1914), affd. per curiam 
221 N.Y. 613, 116 N.E. 1050 (1917). 
186 Campbell v. Herron, 1 N.C. 468 (1801); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816); 
M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C. 209 (1819); Wilkerson v. Bracken, 24 N.C. 315 (1842); Caldwell 
v. Black, 27 N.C. 463 (1845); Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912); 
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926). 
187 Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio 395 (1824). 
188 United States v. Fooshee, (8th Cir. 1915) 225 F. 521; Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 
145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951); Horton 
v. Cronley, (Okla. 1953) 270 P. (2d) 306. 
189 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d) 414, rehearing granted 101 P. (2d) 41~ 
(1940), noted in 20 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1941). 
190 Kinney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. SL Rep. 141 (1866); Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. St. 
Rep. 73 (1869); Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191, 58 A. 136 (1904). 
101 Seabrook's Exr. v. Seabrook, McMul. Eq. {S.C.) 201 (1841). 
192 Hoover"s Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837); State v. Goldberg's Unknown 
Heirs, 113 Tenn. 298, 86 S.W. 717 (1904); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 
434, 134 S.W. {2d) 197 (1939), cert. den., noted in 16 TENN. L. REv. 358 (1940). 
193 Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va. 300, 12 S.E. 753 (1891); Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 
971, 81 S.E. (2d) 560 (1954) (dictum in a deed case). 
194In re Root's Will, 81 Wis. 263, 51 N.W. 435 (1892). 
195 Landic v. Simms, I App. D.C. 507 (1893). See also Barnitz's Lessee v. Robert Casey, 
7 Cranch (II U.S.) 456 (1813). 
196 The doctrine was recognized in the early cases. See Tyler v. Fidelity and Columbia 
Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939 (1914); Mcilvaine v. Robson, 161 Ky. 616, 171 S.W. 
413 (1914). It was repudiated in Mitchell v. Dauphin Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W. 
(2d) 181 (1940). See also Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. 
(2d) IOI 7 (1945). 
197 Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 (1857). 
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Because-- it was a part of the English common law, courts in 
jurisdictions which have not had occasion to adopt or reject it 
may feel compelled to apply it as did the Oregon Supreme Court.198 
It therefore has a potential existence in all states which look to 
the common law except those which have repudiated it by deci-
sion or have abrogated it by statute.199 
XL How IS THE WILLS BRANCH APPLIED? 
Chancellor Kent has said that the wills branch applies thereby 
making the devise void "if it gives precisely the same estate that 
the heir would take by descent if the particular devise to him 
was omitted qut of the will."200 But when does a will give "pre-
cisely the same estate?" Or, conversely, what provisions in a will 
prevent the devise from being "precisely the same estate" and 
thereby take the case outside the wills branch? This question has 
been the source of much litigation in this country. · 
In answering the question American courts have generally 
followed the pattern set in some English cases201 by saying that 
the devise to the heir must be of the same quantity and quality. 
But the meaning of "quantity" and "quality" as used in the 
English decisions bears little resemblance to the meaning of those 
words as reflected by the American decisions, as will presently 
be seen. · 
A. The American Concept of Quantity 
It ha,s previously been pointed out that the English concept 
of "quantity" had reference to tenure, or the nature of the estate 
created-namely, whether the heir took a fee simple, a fee tail, or 
·a life estate.202 Furthermore, in England the test in applying 
the rule, according to Mr. Crosley, "is to strike out of the will 
the particular devise to the heir, and then, if without that he would 
198 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940), noted in 20 ORE. L REv. 
164 (1941). In Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 81 S.E. (2d) 560 (1954), the Supreme 
Court of Vii:ginia was specifically urged to apply the inter vivos branch of the worthier 
title doctrine. But in its opinion it is clear that the court considered the rule applicable 
to either "the grantor's or testator's heirs." 195 Va. 971 at 973. In commenting on whether 
it was obligated to apply the rule, the court said (at 979): "The common law rule, not 
having been abrogated in Virginia, is controlling." Italics added. . 
199 For a discussion of the effect of statutes on the rule, see Part XII infra. 
200 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 14th ed., 506 (1896). 
201 See Part V supra. 
202 See Part V-A supra. 
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take by descent exactly the same estate which the devise purports 
to give him, he is in by descent and not by purchase."203 
While some early American cases adhere to the English view,204 
radical departure is frequently found. Thus ma1:1y decisions 
clearly suggest the test to be this: if the heir takes the same estate 
which he would have taken had the testator died intestate, then 
the rule applies.205 This has been referred to by Professors Harper 
and Heckel as the so-called value, amount, or proportion test.206 
It is, of course, completely foreign to the English concept of 
"quantity." Seldom does the will give the heir the same amount, 
proportion or value of the estate that he would have taken had 
the testator died intestate. Thus it has been held that the wills 
branch does not apply if the heir gets either a lesser share207 or 
a greater share208 of the estate than he would have taken by in-
testacy. One case has even held that since the share of one heir 
could be increased if another heir contested the will, contrary to 
the terms of a no-contest clause, this fact alone would prevent 
the heir from taking the same quantity of estate as he would have 
taken by intestacy.209 Likewise, a provision iri a will directing 
the sale of land and the distribution of the proceeds to the heir 
has been said to prevent the operation of the rule because if the 
testator had died intestate the heir would have taken the land 
itself and not the proceeds therefrom.210 
203 4 KENT, CoMME.NTARIES, 14th ed., 507 (1896), citing CROSLEY's TREATISE ON WILIS 
IOI (1828). Italics added. 
204 Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851). Cf. 
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926). 
205 Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898); Landic v. Simms, 1 App. D.C. 507 
(1893); Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 Ill. 611, 69 N.E. 804 (1904); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 
47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); First Nat. Bank v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901); 
Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 83 N.E. 880 (1908); McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 
417, 1 S. 356 (1887); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816). 
206 Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L. REv. 627 at 648 and 
~~~ . 
207 In re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); In re Coleman's 
Estate, 242 Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. (2d) 517 (1951); Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P. 
1095 (1923). 
208 Rice v. Burkhart, 130 Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906); In re Watenpaugh's Will, 
192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922); In re Schroeder's Estate, 228 Iowa 1198, 293 N.W. 
492 (1940); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951); Kenney v. Glasgow, 
53 Pa. St. Rep. 141 (1866). 
209 Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439, 239 N.W. 692 (1931). 
210 Darst v. Swearingen, 224 Ill. 229, 79 N.E. 635 (1906); In re Sheeler's Estate, 226 
Iowa 650, 284 N.W. 799 (1939). 
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B. The American Concept of Quality 
The English cases, in holding that the estate had to be of the 
same quality, referred to whether the heir took his interest in sev-
eralty, as a joint tenant, -as a coparcenar, or as a tenant in common. 
In other words, if the heir would have taken as a joint tenant under 
the will, but as a tenant in common had the devise been stricken 
from the will, the quality of the estate was not the same in both 
cases and the rule would not apply.211 This view has quite prop-
erly been followed in this country by some courts.212 However, 
its importance in modern times has been somewhat diminished. 
In many states a devise of land by T to A and B, his heirs at law, 
will invest them with the title as tenants in common under the 
will. Had T died intestate they would likewise have been tenants 
in common. Hence, the quality is the same in either case. 
The English courts were also called upon to decide whether 
a charge, an executory interest, a power of sale, or a devise in 
trust would so change the quality of the estate devised to the heir 
as to prevent the rule from applying. For example, suppose T 
devised land to H, his sole heir at law, subject to a charge of $500 
which H was required to pay his brother. The English courts 
held that the existence of the charge did not prevent the applica-
tion of the rule. 213 The same was true although the devise to the 
heir was subject to an executory interest or power of sale.214 Some 
of the American cases adhere to the English view.216 However, in 
other cases it has been held that a charge216 or a power of sale217 
will prevent the rule from applying. These latter decisions again 
point up the fact that some courts are eager to find a reason for 
refusing to apply the wills branch.218 
211 See Part IV-B supra. 
212 Donnelly v. Turner, 60 Md. 81 (1883); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828); 
Campbell v. Herron, 1 N.C. 468 (1801). 
213 See Part V-B-(1) supra. 
214 See Part V-B-(2) and (4) supra. 
215 Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio 
395 (1824); Kenney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. St. Rep. 141 (1866); Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191, 
58 A. 136 (1904). 
216 Davis' Estate, 204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Wehrman v. Farmers and 
Merchants Savings Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935). 
- 217 Dillman v. Fulwider, 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E. 124 (1914). 
· 21s Two Oklahoma decisions clearly demonstrate how far some courts will go in 
attempting to find reasons not to apply the rule. In each case the court pointed to the 
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On the question of whether a trust will prevent the wills 
branch from applying, the only American cases which have really 
considered the question have held that a trust will not prevent 
the rule from applying.219 These cases are unusual in view of the 
fact that some American courts, as we have seen, look for reasons 
to take cases outside the scope of the doctrine. They are even 
more unusual when it is remembered that the English courts have 
on occasion refused to apply the doctrine if a trust were involved.220 
C. Is the Devise Void? 
"The devise to the heirs is void." Statements to that effect are 
frequently found in decisions which recognize and announce the 
wills branch as part of the common law.221 But these statements 
stem basically from the English cases where the statement was 
literally true because of the doctrine of primogeniture.222 If, 
therefore, the devise to the heir at law was void he would of neces-
sity take the land by descent, because the eldest son inherited to 
the exclusion of his brothers and sisters. The eldest son was the 
heir at law.223 
fact that different legal consequences would result if the rule were applied and because 
of that fact it stated that quite obviously the "quality of the estate" was not the same. 
See Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 
231 P. (2d) 668 (1951). 
219 Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P. (2d) 414 
(1940). In the following cases trusts were involved and while it was not discussed there 
is no suggestion that a trust prevents the rule from applying. Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 
433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Boldenweck v. City Nat. Bank&: Trust Co., 343 Ill. App. 569, 99 
N.W. (2d) 692 (1951); Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Parsons v. 
Winslow, 6 Mass. 145 (1810). 
220 See Section V-B-(3) supra . 
.221 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Darst v. Swearingen, 224 Ill. 
229, 79 N.E. 635 (1906); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Stilwell v. 
Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890); Wheeler 
v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); 
Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828); Campbell 
v. Herron, I N.C. 468 (180_1); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816); In re Root's Will, 
81 Wis. 263, 51 N.W. 435 (1892). The writer of the comment in 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 
507 at 507 makes this statement: "Thus if a will devises various life estates with remainders 
over to the legal heirs of the testator and then contains a residuary gift over to others, the 
heirs do not take anything, but their devise or legacy goes back into the testator's estate 
and then to the residuary takers." No cases are cited in support of this statement. 
222 See Part IV-A supra. 
223 If the decedent had only daughters they all constituted the "heir" and took as 
coparceners. The rule did not apply to a devise to daughters because the quality of the 
estate was different. See Part IV-B supra. 
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· But in the United Stc!,tes primogeniture does not obtain and 
if a man dies leaving several children, not one, but all of them 
are his heirs. Suppose, therefore, T has two sons, A and B. He 
wishes to disinherit A. He therefore devises one half of his land 
to Band one half to X, a stranger. Now, is the devise to B really 
void? If it is, then the land will descend to both T's heirs, namely 
A and B, thereby permitting A to inherit contrary to his father's 
wishes. The writer has found no American case which has applied 
the wills branch so as to bring about this legal consequence.224 
It therefore seems proper that the oft-repeated statement "the 
devise to the heir is void" must be tempered by the actual hold-
ings in the cases. 
D. The Form of the Devise 
One significant point of difference exists between the inter 
vivos branch and the wills b:r:anch. It is with respect to the form 
of the limitation. The inter vivos branch applies only to those 
cases where an end limitation is in form to the heirs at law or 
next of kin of the grantor.225 With the wills branch such is not 
the case. If the devise is to persons who are in fact heirs of the 
testator at the time of his death the wills branch will apply whether 
the testator refers to them individually,226 mentions them as a 
class, such as children,227 or refers to them as his "heirs at law."228 
224See, however, Mdlvaine v. Robinson, 161 Ky. 616, 171 S.W. 413 (1914), and the 
comment thereon in Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532 at 537, 142 S.W. 
(2d) 181 (1940), where it is suggested that the wills branch did give an heir an interest 
in land which she would not have received had the wills branch not been applied. See 
also Rawley v. Sanns, 141 Ind. 179, 40 N.E. 674 (1895), and M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C. 209 
(1819). 
225 See Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 OKLA. L. REv. 
133 at 149 (1949). 
226 Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 
558 (1880); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); Tennant v. Smith, 173 
Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915); Herring v. Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919); 
In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); In r1e Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa 
920, 54 N.W. (2d) 433 (1952); Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837); University 
v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816). 
227 Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E. 310 (1889); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 
Ind. 398 (1881). 
22s Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill. 
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920). But in Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898), it was 
strongly suggested that the form of the limitation had to be the "lawful heirs" of the 
testator before the wills branch would apply. Likewise, in the recent case of Boldenweck 
v. City Nat. Bank &: Trust Co., 343 Ill. App. 569, 99 N.E. (2d) 692 (1951), the court 
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The wills branch therefore is much broader in scope because it 
applies to both present and future interests and likewise is not 
dependent upon an exact form of limitation before it comes into 
play. 
E. A Rule of Law 
There would appear to be no doubt that in England the wills 
branch was applied as a rule of law.229 In the United States the 
same conclusion seems justified.230 That is to say, the writer has 
found no decision which has treated the rule as one designed to 
aid the court in ascertaining the probable intention of the testa-
tor. It is true that in Iowa it has been inferred that the rule may 
be one of construction since it constitutes the springboard upon 
which a court can find a "manifest intent" that the testator would 
not want the lapse statute applied to his will.231 Likewise, it is 
suggested in two early Illinois cases that the rule is one of con-
struction.232 However, on the whole it clearly seems to be applied 
as a rule of law. Indeed, it would appear that the principal rea-
son some courts go so far to find facts making the rule inappli-
cable is to avoid its heavy hand.233 
F. Personal Property 
The wills branch having its origin in ancient feudal land 
law might logically be presumed to have no application to per-
sonal property. Especially would this seem to follow since even 
observed (at 590): "The rule upon which plaintiffs rely applies only to limitations of 
remainders to right heirs. Manifestly, the rule cannot apply where from the will, as a 
whole, it appears that the testator used the word 'heirs' in a sense other than right heirs." 
229 See Part II•C supra. 
230 Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 
Incl. 398 (1881); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Latrobe v. 
Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v. 
Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); University v. Holstead, 
4 N.C. 289 (1816); Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926); United States 
v. Fooshee, (8th Cir. 1915) 225 F. 521 (1915); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d) 
732, rehearing granted, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940); Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 
(1837). See also the cases cited in notes 175 to 195 supra. 
231 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 
1066 (1951). 
232 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill. 
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920). 
233 See Part XI-A and B supra. 
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in the United States it is generally regarded as a rule of law. Sur-
prisingly, however, there are a few decisions which actually apply 
the doctrine to personal property.234 Moreover, some courts while 
not squarely passing on the point have clearly indicated that the 
rule is applicable to personal property.235 
However, in most jurisdictions when the wills branch has been 
urged the subject matter of the action has been land. Accordingly 
it seems correct to say that as a rule of property based on feudal con-
cepts, as distinguished from a rule of construction, the doctrine 
should be applied only to real property.236 
XII. STATUTORY ABOLITION 
A recent decision by the Iowa Supreme Court points up the 
fact that the wills branch was abolished in England thirteen years 
before Iowa became a state.237 As compared to its treatment in 
England the rule has fared much better in the hands of American 
legislators. In this country it has been abrogated by statute only 
in Kansas,238 Nebraska,239 and Illinois.240 In addition, Minnesota 
has a statute the effect of which probably abolishes the rule.241 
Partial abolition may result in states having statutes which pro-
vide in effect that the word "heirs" is to be treated as a word of 
purchase.242 And, as previously pointed out, the rule has received 
judicial repudiation in Georgia243 and Kentucky.244 
For a rule of law which has no useful purpose it is somewhat 
234 In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Thompson v. Turner, 
173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810). 
235 Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E. 310 (1889); Denny v. Denny, 123 
Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890); In re Hawes' Estate, 162 App. Div. 173, 147 N.Y.S. 329 (1914), 
affd. per curiam, 221 N.Y. 613, 116 N.E. 1050 (1917). 
236 Lord v. Bourne, 63 Me. 368, 18 Am. St. Rep. 234 (1873); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 
306, 97 P. (2d) 732, rehearing granted 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940). 
237 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 at 112 (1950). 
238 Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) §58-506. 
239 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §76-114. 
240 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) §188. 
241 Minn. Stat. (1953) §500.14 (4). 
242 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) §108; 20 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) §180.14 (4). 
243 Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 (1857). 
244 Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W. (2d) 181 (1940). 
See also Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. (2d) 1017 (1945). 
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surprising that it has not received the same legislative "treatment" 
which the rule in Shelley's case has received.245 The reason it has 
not lies, perhaps, in the fact that it is not universally well known. 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
What meritorious arguments can be made in favor of the wills 
branch of the worthier title doctrine? The writer can think of 
none. The rule invites litigation, ensnares the unwary drafts-
man and frustrates the wary draftsman. As a rule of law it applies 
to devises made to people who are ~e most natural objects of 
the testator's bounty. To the writer's knowledge, every man 
who has taken up the pen to write on the policy aspects of the rule 
has concluded that it has no place in our law.246 Such unanimity 
of opinion from all segments of our profession is seldom seen. 
There is one argument to be made in favor of the rule when 
it is applied to prevent a renunciation by the heir to the detri-
ment of his creditors.247 However, the answer to that problem 
is to enact legislation placing the heir and devisee in exactly the 
same position in so far as legal consequences are concerned. In 
other words, renunciation should be permitted as to both or 
denied as to both.248 
It is the writer's view that if the legislatures of every state, 
which have not already done so, would adopt the proposed stat-
245 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §313 (1948 Supp.) shows thirty-six jurisdictions have abol-
ished the rule in Shelley's Case by statute in whole or in part. 
246 "The purpose for the application of the doctrine of worthier title at common law 
finds no support in our law." McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 III. 391 at 393, 59 N.E. (2d) 811 
(1945); " .•. the doctrine of worthier title serves to hinder, rather than aid, in the ascer-
tainment of the intention of a testator, which is the cardinal purpose in the construction 
of wills and that it has no place in our jurisprudence." Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit 
Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532 at 538, 142 S.W. (2d) 181 (1940); "The reason for the rule in 
England, to that effect, does not apply in this state." Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 at 659 
(1857); "In its original form it had no relation to the genius of our laws." Beem v. 
Beem, 241 Iowa 247 at 255, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 
(1951); "But a vestige, a survival of ancient legal theory, it serves no genuine social pur-
pose, if accurately applied." Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 Iu.. L. 
REY. 627 at 655 (1930); "It is hoped that the Iowa court will eliminate this antiquated 
doctrine from the Iowa law." Note, 39 IowA L. REv. 199 at 202 (1953). 
247 See Part IX-B supra. 
248 See, for example, MODEL PROBATE CODE §58 (1946). 
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ute of the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws abolishing the rule, the land would be rid 
of an outmoded doctrine.249 
249 "When any property is limited, mediately or immediately, in an othenvise effec• 
tive testamentary conveyance, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the con-
veyor, or to a person or persons who on the death of the conveyor are some or all of his 
heirs or next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by purchase and not by descent." 
Uniform Property Act §14. 
